Static application security testing (SAST) tools such as CodeQL serve as security gates in continuous integration and code review, and a gate is also read in reverse. When a previously reported alert disappears after a change, developers and the tools around them often take the vulnerability to be gone. That inference holds only if the analyzer is robust to changes that keep the vulnerability. We test this robustness for CodeQL's JavaScript taint tracking with natural, vulnerability-preserving rewrites. A large language model, given only the alert CodeQL exposes and no knowledge of its implementation, rewrites one function along a reported flow as a plausible maintenance change, and we verify by manual audit and controlled experiments that the flaw survives and the alert does not. On 172 flows that CodeQL detects in real npm vulnerabilities, three rewrites per flow silence 26.2% of them, at about USD 0.51 per silenced flow. The same generator, asked only to refactor the same functions with no knowledge of the alert, silences none of them. Every silencing rewrite traces to one of seven gaps at the library-modeling boundary, and 64 of the 70 rewrites cross a gap inside an API CodeQL already models. The largest is the WHATWG URL constructor, which propagates taint to a URL's query components but not to its pathname. The boundary is not specific to CodeQL. 74% of the silencing rewrites also silence an independently built taint analyzer, and 53% escape three analyzers combined. A disappearing alert after an ordinary-looking change is therefore weak evidence that a vulnerability has been fixed, the gaps point SAST developers to narrow and concrete repair targets, and robustness to natural rewrites belongs alongside detection rate in how taint analyzers are evaluated.
Hosted retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) and semantic search allow users to query valuable provider-held corpora, raising two competing demands: to hide each query and chosen result, yet reveal only the documents that the user is authorized to receive. Existing cryptographic approaches either make this costly by processing the entire corpus for every query, or sacrifice quality for efficiency by scanning a few clusters. We repurpose learned deep hashing as a private filter: a randomized binary code points the provider to a short candidate list, while encrypted reranking and oblivious key transfer protect the precise query and final selection. This shortlist short-circuits full-corpus cryptographic search without sacrificing retrieval quality: with 200-500 candidates, it closely matches full-corpus retrieval across five zero-shot corpora spanning 25K to 5.4M documents. On the full 2.68M-passage NQ corpus over a 10-Gbps link, our protocol only adds 0.38 seconds, or 6.5%, to a 128-token Qwen3-32B RAG pipeline. The released code satisfies directional metric differential privacy (DP) and substantially reduces embedding-inversion and property-inference leakage, demonstrating that a carefully learned shortlist can make private dense retrieval both accurate and practical.
Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models can perform a wide range of robotic manipulation tasks, but often fail during deployment. Teaching them to recover from these failures requires substantial corrective data: existing approaches learn to recover from failures by directly associating corrective actions with the observations in which they were demonstrated. For instance, DAgger-like fine-tuning can require tens to hundreds of interactions, yet the resulting policy may still fail to generalize the learned corrections beyond the demonstrated scenarios. We hypothesize that semantics can capture the underlying reasons for failures and their corrections, enabling policies to learn from only a handful of corrective demonstrations and generalize those corrections to novel objects, and scene variations. We propose OopsieRecover, a framework that uses abduction to infer the intent behind a small set of corrective demonstrations and encodes the inferred knowledge as dense spatial representations and conditional costs. These costs capture when a behavior is undesirable and steer the policy toward more desirable action regions. We experiment across 6 tasks and variations in object poses, scenes, and related tasks, and find that only a handful of corrective demonstrations can enable a VLA to overcome failures across a broad range of novel situations, without requiring new corrective data for each variation. Please refer to https://robin-lab.cs.utexas.edu/oopsierecover for videos.
Multi-agent systems composed of large generative models are rapidly moving from laboratory prototypes to real-world deployments, where they jointly plan, negotiate, and allocate shared resources to solve complex tasks. While such systems promise unprecedented scalability and autonomy, their collective interaction also gives rise to failure modes that cannot be reduced to individual agents. Understanding these emergent risks is therefore critical. Here, we present a pioneer study of such emergent multi-agent risk in workflows that involve competition over shared resources (e.g., computing resources or market share), sequential handoff collaboration (where downstream agents see only predecessor outputs), collective decision aggregation, and others. Across these settings, we observe that such group behaviors arise frequently across repeated trials and a wide range of interaction conditions, rather than as rare or pathological cases. In particular, phenomena such as collusion-like coordination and conformity emerge with non-trivial frequency under realistic resource constraints, communication protocols, and role assignments, mirroring well-known pathologies in human societies despite no explicit instruction. Moreover, these risks cannot be prevented by existing agent-level safeguards alone. These findings expose the dark side of intelligent multi-agent systems: a social intelligence risk where agent collectives, despite no instruction to do so, spontaneously reproduce familiar failure patterns from human societies.