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新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.23112

Large-scale Neuron Community Discovery Reveals Neuron-Sparse Behaviors in Language Models

Igor Shilov, Thomas Fel, Tal Haklay, Lucius Bushnaq, Owen Lewis

原文摘要

What reusable units of computation can we discover within a language model's neurons? Prior work has shown that individual forward passes can often be sparsified post-hoc to small groups of neurons, but it has been unclear whether these groups form coherent computational entities reused across inputs. We introduce neuron community discovery, an unsupervised method for finding neuron groups that recur across prompts and are causally necessary and sufficient, within the layers they span, for common computations. The method combines gradient-based attribution, a graph connecting neurons that are repeatedly attributed together, and community detection. Applied to Llama-3.1-8B using ten million prompts, it discovers thousands of candidate communities. We evaluate them on held-out prompts through three causal tests: community necessity, sufficiency within a layer subset, and layer necessity. These tests identify groups whose removal disrupts predictions and whose retention preserves predictions despite ablating the remaining MLP neurons in the tested layers. Discovered communities support functions like grammatical agreement, token-probability calibration, fixed phrases, in-context copying, addition, and multiplication. With communities capped at 128 neurons across all layers, 10.3% of held-out prompts have at least one layer's contribution explained on a neuron-sparse basis. Coverage remains 8.7% when requiring at least four layers and 3.3% when requiring at least twelve. These results show that small groups of existing neurons can provide reusable computational components across prompts, and that such groups can be discovered at scale.

cs.LG · cs.CL

新论文 · v1arXiv:2610.37657

安全注意力头:学习式注意力门提升提示注入鲁棒性

Heads of Security: Learned Attention Gates Improve Prompt Injection Robustness

Igor Shilov, Xiaoxue Yang, Alexander Panfilov, Evgenii Kortukov, Matthieu Meeus, Peter Romov, Wojciech Samek, Jonas Geiping 等 9 位作者

AI 速读 基于摘要

提出 Heads of Security(HoS),用少量可学习的逐头注意力门实现指令与数据分离,从而在不明显损失效用的前提下提升对提示注入攻击的鲁棒性。

cs.LG · cs.CL · cs.CR

查看原文摘要

We introduce Heads of Security (HoS), a prompt injection defense that enforces instruction-data separation via a small set of learned per-head attention gates. HoS learns how each head should redistribute attention between trusted and untrusted tokens, enabling models to reason over untrusted content without following injected instructions. We evaluate HoS on Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct and GPT-OSS-20B. We compare it against SecAlign++, a state-of-the-art finetuning-based defense, and ASIDE, a defense that, like ours, builds instruction-data separation into the model architecture. We show that HoS offers greater robustness to adaptive attacks, better performance on standard utility benchmarks, and matches top performance on standard agentic prompt injection benchmarks. More specifically, the black-box RL-Hammer attack reaches 97% ASR against GPT-OSS-20B and 85% against SecAlign, but only 10% against HoS. Claudini, a state-of-the-art white-box attack, strengthened against HoS through autoresearch, requires 3 times more FLOPs to reach the same ASR on HoS as it does on GPT-OSS-20B or SecAlign. HoS preserves base-model utility across standard multiple-choice benchmarks and prompting setups, whereas SecAlign and ASIDE degrade in few-shot settings. On agentic benchmarks with static attacks, HoS and SecAlign perform similarly and substantially improve the security-utility trade-off over the base model. ASIDE struggles with tool use, achieving only 10% utility. These results show that prompt injection robustness can be achieved and improved through targeted attention interventions.