Jakub Tłuczek, Victor Villin, Christos Dimitrakakis
原文摘要
Fairness is desirable yet challenging to achieve within multi-agent systems, especially when agents differ in latent traits that affect their abilities. This hidden heterogeneity often leads to unequal distributions of wealth, even when agents operate under the same rules. Motivated by real-world examples, we propose a framework based on repeated principal-agent games, where a principal, who also can be seen as a player of the game, learns to offer adaptive contracts to agents. By leveraging a simple yet powerful contract structure, we show that a fairness-aware principal can learn homogeneous linear contracts that equalize outcomes across agents in a sequential social dilemma. Importantly, this fairness does not come at the cost of efficiency: our results demonstrate that it is possible to promote equity and stability in the system while preserving overall performance.
Victor Villin, Till Freihaut, Andreas Schlaginhaufen, Christos Dimitrakakis, Maryam Kamgarpour, Giorgia Ramponi
原文摘要
Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) aims to recover expert rewards that transfer across environments with differing dynamics. Prior work has shown that such transfer is possible when gathering expert demonstrations across sufficiently different dynamics. In practice, however, expert demonstrations are costly, making it critical to select the right dynamics to reduce the quantity of expert data required for learning transferable rewards. We propose a two-phase approach: we first cycle through the available dynamics to obtain a reliable reward estimate, then actively select dynamics to reduce our uncertainty about the expert reward. Crucially, this yields novel sample complexity guarantees on transfer that hold for any dynamics, with a rate independent of the number of available dynamics. Empirically, our method significantly reduces the number of expert demonstrations needed to learn a transferable reward.