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原文摘要

We model indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack (IND-CPA) games as binary classification tasks for deep neural networks (DNNs). We apply this methodology to the public-key encryption (PKE) schemes used to construct PQC key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) such as ML-KEM and HQC, and to cascaded symmetric algorithms, demonstrating methodological generality. Moreover, we present a novel extension of this approach to empirical distinguishability testing of hybrid KEMs. For IND-CPA-secure schemes and their combinations, no DNN achieves accuracy significantly different from random guessing (measured via Bonferroni-corrected binomial tests), consistent with theoretical security guarantees. For insecure schemes, such as plain RSA, AES-CTR and AES-CBC with IV or counter reuse, or RC4, the DNNs classify the ciphertexts better than random guessing. Thus, this framework is shown to serve as a practical, scheme-agnostic tool for flagging distinguishable ciphertexts in both individual and composed constructions.