Omkar Shrikanth, Soham Dambalkar, Parag Jyoti Pal, Advik Raj Basani, Arnab K. Paul
原文摘要
Malicious adversaries can employ gradient inversion attacks to reverse-engineer private data using the model updates of a round in Federated Learning. While there have been developments in gradient inversion for text, exact text recovery by a malicious client has so far remained infeasible, as FedAvg entangles the gradient contributions of many clients and obscures the signal of any individual sentence. We introduce a novel attack pipeline that unwinds this entanglement progressively through an iterative loop, in which the gradient contributions of sentences recovered exactly in one round are subtracted from the aggregate, exposing the remaining sentences for recovery in the next iteration. We show, for the first time, exact sentence recovery, with 100% precision, and on aggregates containing up to $4\times$ more tokens than the model's hidden dimension, we recover up to 80.2% of client sentences exactly, a regime where existing attacks recover none exactly.
Knowledge Editing (KE) has emerged as a frontier for updating specific facts in LLMs without costly retraining, but its reliability and underlying mechanisms remain poorly understood. In this work, we examine KE from an adversarial elicitation perspective, revealing that edited knowledge is often not fully erased and continues to surface, with consistent failures observed across diverse model architectures. To explain this behavior, we conduct a mechanistic analysis of popular KE methods. We show that low-rank updates do not overwrite existing knowledge but instead redistribute it within the model's representation space. Furthermore, we find that these methods act as targeted suppression mechanisms that reduce the likelihood of expressing original facts, rather than removing them from the model. Analysis of the loss landscape reveals that edited knowledge lies in narrow, anisotropic regions that are highly sensitive to perturbations, making them highly vulnerable to indirect prompting and adversarial attacks. By exposing these profound architectural vulnerabilities, our work proves that KE algorithms are inherently bypassable and motivates a fundamental reevaluation of how we deploy post-hoc updates in several LLM applications.