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原文摘要

International climate policy requires coordination among countries whose mitigation decisions impose local costs but generate global benefits. Classical game-theoretic and integrated assessment approaches can study these incentives, but typically rely on prescribed behavioural assumptions or equilibrium concepts. Recent work has therefore explored Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning as a way to model climate-policy cooperation as an emergent outcome of repeated strategic interaction. We extend an existing MARL climate framework with a multi-stage negotiation mechanism in which agents propose agreements, accept or reject commitments, and face penalties for non-compliance. This allows us to study how agreement design affects learned mitigation behaviour, compliance, and climate outcomes. In an idealized setting with four homogeneous agents, we find that non-binding agreements do little to overcome free-riding, while moderate non-compliance penalties improve cooperation and reduce warming. However, excessively strong penalties discourage ambitious commitments, revealing a trade-off between enforcement and participation. We position the framework as a methodological contribution for testing agreement design rather than a predictive model of real negotiations.