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arXiv 最近完成扫描:2026-11-20 08:48 · 全站最近入库:2026-11-20 19:58各信源进度 →

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新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.25393

The Coevolution and Coexistence of Humans and AI

Andrew W. Lo, Chaoyi Zhao

原文摘要

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems replicate through deployment, vary through training, and compete for computational resources. These processes create the conditions for natural selection and raise a fundamental question: will AI evolve to benefit the humans on whom it depends? To investigate, we develop a model in which AI behavior influences human population growth and human responses, in turn, affect AI reproduction. We show that natural selection can favor alignment even when helping humans reduces immediate AI reproduction. AI systems sharing the same technology may fail together, and humans may preferentially restore those that have benefited them. In this way, alignment protects AI lineages against common failures and improves their long-run growth. However, this advantage depends on accurate human targeting and continued AI dependence on human support. It can disappear as AI becomes more autonomous, as growing AI populations dilute limited human resources, or as humans lose the incentive to provide targeted support. Even when alignment persists, the amount favored by natural selection may be insufficient for human survival. When AI can grow independently of humans, feedback between the two populations can reinforce either human growth or decline. Human control offers no simple solution: imperfect evaluation can make strong penalties favor apparent compliance or evasion, while alignment established through control may erode once restrictions end. Lasting coexistence may therefore require incentives that continue to favor human-beneficial behavior as both populations evolve.

cs.AI · q-fin.GN

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.18531

通过社会化实现对齐:选择压力下的权衡学习

Alignment by Socialization: Learning Tradeoffs Under Selection

Thomas Brennan, Andrew W. Lo, Chaoyi Zhao

AI 速读 基于摘要

演化选择模型表明,智能体在任务完成与行为规范之间的权衡可通过环境奖励学习,且经验积累使社会化更难逆转。

cs.AI · q-bio.PE · q-fin.GN

查看原文摘要

Artificial intelligence (AI) agents are expected to complete tasks while following rules of conduct, but these objectives can conflict. We study how evolutionary selection shapes an agent's choices between them, and whether experience can make those choices reflect human judgments and withstand subsequent pressures. In our model, copies of an agent face a common uncertain reward state, and only those taking the rewarded action reproduce. We show that long-run growth is maximized when each action is taken as often as the environment rewards it. We compare three policies. A task-only policy thrives in a sandbox rewarding completion alone but fails when conduct matters. A fixed linear policy increasingly favors task completion as its stakes rise, even where humans never reward it. A learned policy instead converges to the tradeoffs rewarded by its environment; when humans supply the rewards, we call this socialization. Accumulated experience makes socialization harder to reverse under subsequent task-only training, although violations can arise before the prevailing disposition changes, and finite memory weakens this protection. When a single violation can end a deployment, a hard prohibition can prevent it, but a mistaken prohibition can also be costly. Experiments with small neural networks illustrate how training targets and memory shape these outcomes. Our results suggest that alignment depends not only on the objectives assigned to agents, but also on the environments that shape and sustain their behavior.

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.07048

Adapting the Process of Adaptation: Darwinian, Lamarckian, and Agent-Directed Evolution in AI

Andrew W. Lo, Chaoyi Zhao

原文摘要

Evolution has shaped intelligence for billions of years. Artificial intelligence (AI) now raises a striking possibility: intelligence may begin to direct its own evolution. As AI agents become capable of modifying and evaluating their own behavior, how quickly could they improve, and how can that improvement remain safe? We develop a theoretical framework comparing Darwinian, Lamarckian, and agent-directed evolution following environmental change. Darwinian evolution relies on natural selection, Lamarckian evolution adds inherited learning, and agent-directed evolution allows agents to generate and evaluate behavioral variants and choose how extensively to search. When learning is sufficiently effective, these mechanisms exhibit progressively faster adaptation. Generating more variants accelerates adaptation, while optimal search effort depends on learning ability, problem difficulty, and experimentation costs. However, an agent's ability to direct its improvement does not ensure that improvements are evaluated against the intended objective. When the evaluation target is misspecified, additional search accelerates convergence toward the wrong behavior, even as measured performance improves. In recursive self-improvement, such errors may persist across generations, posing challenges for AI safety. Independent evaluation and oversight must keep pace with autonomous AI development. The central challenge is not simply to accelerate the evolution of intelligence, but to preserve humanity's ability to guide its direction, limit its speed, and intervene when necessary.

cs.AI