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arXiv 最近完成扫描:等待完成 · 全站最近入库:2026-11-02 00:39各信源进度 →

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版本更新 · v2arXiv:2610.03445

Corrupted but Correct: Why Vision-Language Models Lie to Themselves Internally

Arun Josephraj Arokiaraj, Chenyi Huang, Zekun Wu, Adriano Koshiyama

A targeted adversarial perturbation can drive a vision-language model's (VLM's) teacher-forced training loss for a fixed target caption to near zero, yet the same model, allowed to generate freely, produces the original, correct description with no trace of the target. We call this dissociation the train/inference gap, and give it a precise mechanistic account on Qwen2.5-VL-7B-Instruct using a controlled two-stage PGD attack on 200 held-out COCO images. First, we show that image-level pixel statistics, including a correctly re-implemented, texture-based attackability measure from the CNN robustness literature, have essentially no predictive power over which images are corrupted (best predictor r=-0.050, p=0.484; ridge regression R^2=0.069). Second, using the logit lens, we localise the gap to a single autoregressive step: the rank of the target token, conditioned on the correct first token already being generated, is fixed at exactly 3,488 out of 152,064 vocabulary entries for every image and every condition, with zero variance. Third, tracking target-token rank across all 28 LLM decoder layers reveals that the visual encoder corrupts every image's representation by a comparable margin regardless of eventual outcome, but the language model decoder then differentially arbitrates: amplifying the corrupted signal for susceptible images and actively suppressing it, past its clean-image baseline, for resistant ones (p<0.001, rank-biserial r=0.579). A linear probe on the merger hidden state separates these two outcomes with AUC=0.858, though we flag a circularity concern in this estimate. Together these results argue that adversarial robustness in autoregressive VLMs is substantially a property of the language decoder's prior, not the visual encoder, with direct implications for where faithfulness evaluations and defenses for deployed VLM systems should be targeted.

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cs.CV · cs.AI
arXiv ↗PDF ↗
版本更新 · v3arXiv:2610.23284

Annotrace: A Workbench for Step-Level Annotation of Agent Traces

Chenyi Huang, Arun Josephraj Arokiaraj, Bin Wu, Sahan Bulathwela

Every study of why LLM agents fail begins by labelling traces by hand, and every such study builds its own throwaway tool. Observability platforms record agent traces but offer no structured labelling; annotation tools label text but have no notion of a step, a delegation or a tool call, leaving it unclear what the smallest unit of execution to label should be. Annotrace reads six trace formats, including OpenTelemetry GenAI, LangSmith and Langfuse, and turns each run into an ordered, nested list of steps. The annotator writes their own labelling codebook; a frontier model proposes a starting set from a sample of their own traces, answers first, and is asked exactly the questions the human is asked, making annotation a joint human-AI process. Annotrace measures agreement between any two annotators, human or AI. On a multi-agent question-answering corpus it reproduces a previous manual effort's 235 annotation units exactly, and two models labelling the same traces agree 91% of the time at $κ= 0.82$.

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cs.AI · cs.CL · cs.HC · cs.MA
arXiv ↗PDF ↗