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版本更新 · v2arXiv:2606.20668

BELLS-O: Evaluating the Operational Trade-offs of LLM Supervision Systems

Leonhard Waibl, Felix Michalak, Hadrien Mariaccia

原文摘要

LLM supervision systems, namely input/output moderation filters and jailbreak detectors, are the primary safeguard against misuse in deployed AI applications, yet existing benchmarks are often vendor-biased, omit cost and latency, and rarely compare specialized guardrails against repurposed generalist LLMs. We present BELLS-O (Benchmark for the Evaluation of LLM Supervision Systems, Operational), an independent operational benchmark that evaluates 33 systems from 17 developers: specialized guardrails (e.g., Llama Guard 4, ShieldGemma-2B, Lakera Guard) and frontier generalists repurposed as supervisors (e.g., GPT-5.4, Claude Sonnet 4.6, Grok 4.1 Fast), jointly on detection rate, false-positive rate, latency, and cost. We cover input/output moderation across 11 harm categories, jailbreak detection across 13 attack techniques, and prompt-injection detection, using in-house datasets built from handcrafted prompts, curated external samples, and quality-controlled synthetic generation, with synthetic moderation samples paraphrased to suppress generator fingerprints. Content-moderation runs are repeated five times and all rates reported with 95% intervals. The Pareto frontier reveals use-case-dependent tradeoffs. On content moderation, specialized supervisors are operationally ahead: top systems match the best generalist LLMs on detection (93-96%, no significant difference) at low false-positive rates while running ~5x faster; cost depends more on serving setup than on class. On jailbreak detection, generalist LLMs achieve higher median detection on three of four datasets and lower false-positive rates, but at higher latency and, for closed frontier models, 10-100x higher cost. On prompt injection, the two best dedicated detectors lead. We release the framework, an interactive leaderboard, and four datasets as a vendor-neutral basis for selecting safeguards under deployment constraints.

cs.CR · cs.AI · cs.LG