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原文摘要

Coordinating a large population of flexible grid-edge devices can alleviate the need for time-consuming and capital-intensive network upgrades. Artificial intelligence (AI)-based control methods such as multi-agent reinforcement learning or imitation learning are promising to this coordination due to their real-time decision scalability. However, system operators still need an independent and rigorous way to decide whether a given AI system is safe enough for deployment. This paper develops a \emph{finite-sample} probabilistic safety certification framework for AI-based grid-edge coordination. The central idea is to reduce the complete input--AI--decision--evaluation workflow to a binary unsafe outcome under an operator-defined safety specification, and then use exact binomial inference to certify the corresponding unsafe operation probability. Given a set of held-out calibration scenarios, the framework returns the tightest one-sided upper certificate and an accept/reject deployment criterion that controls the probability of false safety certification. Because the certification is for the calibration distribution that may \emph{deviate} from the future operation, we further combine the nominal certificate with physically interpretable sample-space adversarial attacks, a concept widely used in AI models to investigate their fragility. Case studies on grid-edge flexibility coordination with 1{,}000-agent AI models (independent parameters) verify the safety guarantee and the value of integrating adversarial attacks into a rolling-window training-certification-deployment flow.