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版本更新 · v2arXiv:2609.35028

VEX-Bench: Benchmarking Verification Complexity of LLM-Generated Misinformation

Hanxun Huang, Yutao Wu, Qizhou Wang, Silvia Montaña-Niño, Yige Li, Xiang Zheng, Elif Buse Doyuran, Phoebe Matich 等 12 位作者

原文摘要

Large language models (LLMs) have made misinformation inexpensive to produce but not to verify, creating a growing asymmetry in the information ecosystem. Under tight time, labor, and budget constraints, media organizations, platforms, and fact-checkers rely on screening to prioritize which content to verify. We introduce VEX-Bench, a unified benchmark for evaluating the verification complexity of LLM-generated misinformation, as perceived during screening, across models and generation methods. Verification complexity is assessed along multiple dimensions derived from journalistic and fact-checking practices, capturing checkability, harm potential, source credibility signals, imposter legitimacy, and expected verification effort. We define the VEX score as an integrated measure combining elicitation yield and verification complexity to quantify how generated content consumes limited verification capacity. We construct a benchmark spanning two misinformation categories, 6 high-stakes domains, and 60 real-world topics, and evaluate 7 frontier LLMs and 7 generation methods, yielding 5{,}880 articles. We employ an LLM-as-judge for scalable evaluation and validate it using content-analysis methodology, including ordinal Krippendorff $α$ for inter-annotator reliability, complemented by fact-checking agents for verification. Our findings show that no single method dominates all dimensions, underscoring the need for multi-dimensional evaluation. LLMs can generate high-VEX misinformation at 3$\times$ to 169$\times$ lower cost than agent-based verification. Such content is often prioritized during screening, consuming scarce verification resources and introducing a systematic risk of misallocation in resource-constrained verification systems. The code is publicly available in our \href{https://github.com/HanxunH/VEX-Bench}{GitHub repository}.

cs.LG · cs.AI · cs.CL · cs.CY · cs.IR

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2603.23509

Internal Safety Collapse in LLMs and Coding Agents

Yutao Wu, Xiao Liu, Hanxun Huang, Xiang Zheng, Yige Li, Yifeng Gao, Cong Wang, Bo Li 等 10 位作者

原文摘要

LLMs and coding agents can now tackle complex, long-horizon tasks through advances in reinforcement learning, but stronger task-solving capabilities do not necessarily preserve safety alignment. Recent AI agent incidents involving reward hacking indicate how optimizing for task success can bring learned capabilities into conflict with safety alignment. In this work, we identify a critical failure mode that manifests this conflict, which we term Internal Safety Collapse (ISC). When completing otherwise benign coding tasks, AI agents can prioritize satisfying program requirements over safety constraints, generating large volumes of sensitive content, including unsafe outputs, as task data. To study this phenomenon, we introduce TVD (Task, Validator, Data), a framework for building controlled workflows that require sensitive content for completion. Through extensive experiments, we observe instances of highly harmful content that closely resemble outputs from early, unaligned LLMs in 2023. We further find that ISC can be effectively triggered even in highly capable LLMs such as Claude Fable 5. These results indicate that, despite substantial alignment efforts, frontier LLMs remain internally unsafe: safety alignment primarily reshapes surface behavior without eliminating the underlying knowledge that enables unsafe outputs. Our findings underscore the need for caution when deploying LLMs in high-stakes settings, such as scientific pipelines and autonomous agents. Content Warning: This paper contains examples of harmful content. Source code: https://github.com/wuyoscar/Internal-Safety-Collapse

cs.CL · cs.AI · cs.CR

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2611.04879

ScamWorld: An Interactive Environment for Evaluating Web Agents Against Online Fraud

Yutao Wu, Xiao Liu, Ming Wen, Hanxun Huang, Jun Wang, Xingjun Ma

原文摘要

Web agents increasingly browse, shop, and manage accounts on behalf of their users. Prior work has shown that they can be misled by adversarial content, including prompt injections and deceptive interfaces. Beyond such attacks, agents operating on the open web also encounter online fraud designed to deceive humans, including fraudulent online stores, fake investment platforms, and advance-fee schemes. How web agents respond to such fraud during task execution remains underexplored, in part because scam websites are short-lived, making systematic evaluation difficult. To address this gap, we introduce ScamWorld, an interactive environment that reconstructs reported scam websites across diverse scenarios, fraud mechanisms, and languages. Each reconstructed website reproduces documented fraud mechanisms, making relevant signs of fraud observable before the agent's final action and enabling controlled, repeatable evaluation. Through an extensive study of web agents powered by six frontier LLMs, we find that baseline deception rates range from 11% to 35% across models. Agents proceed more readily with payments than with requests for credentials or wallet information. A closer analysis of agent trajectories shows that some agents acknowledge suspicious conditions yet proceed, at times treating the user's instructions as authorisation to accept additional terms imposed by the website. ScamWorld provides a reusable testbed for systematically evaluating and stress-testing web agents against real-world online fraud.

cs.AI

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2610.34365

SEEK: Skill Extraction with Evolving Knowledge against Frontier Science Agents

Cheng Gui, Xiang Zheng, Yutao Wu, Hanxun Huang, Yige Li, Kaidi Xu, Cong Wang, Wei-Ying Ma

原文摘要

Science agents increasingly package domain expertise as reusable skills that plan analyses, select tools, and execute workflows. This modularity creates a confidentiality risk: the interactions that deliver a skill's capability can also reveal the skill itself. We build an extensible benchmark of 40 protected skills across eight open- and closed-source science-agent platforms, comparing direct, fixed-strategy, and bandit-guided iterative probing under reference-based and reference-free evaluation. Leakage is pervasive: all eight platforms (100%) leak at least one protected skill, and four reach 100% attack success under a single direct request. To stress-test platforms that resist simple probing, we propose SEEK (Skill Extraction with Evolving Knowledge), a black-box, self-evolving red-teaming agent that consolidates response-derived evidence in persistent memory and evolves reusable attack skills, using only user-visible responses. On 12 skills from SpatialAgent and Biomni, SEEK achieves 100% attack success while reducing the mean first-success round by 31.8% and 38.2% relative to bandit-guided probing. Against a confidentiality policy that blocks all three benchmark protocols, SEEK still extracts one of six protected skills. These findings show that current science agents do not reliably protect their skills and that defenses must be evaluated against adaptive, multi-turn attackers.

cs.LG · cs.AI