跳到正文
研踪PaperTrail

论文库

检索计算机领域论文,按研究方向、作者或关键词筛选。

部分采集异常
正在读取账号与研究记录…

全站更新概况

+1959新增论文
+1550其中 AI 相关
+212已有论文修订
+76新增 AI 导读

arXiv 最近完成扫描:2026-11-17 23:20 · 全站最近入库:2026-11-17 23:35各信源进度 →

统计口径与数据新鲜度

统计 2026-11-17 00:47 — 2026-11-18 00:47(北京时间) · 点击数字查看对应简报;AI 相关包含在新增论文内。

最近完成检查:2026-11-17 23:20最近发现新增版本:2026-11-17 23:35库内论文最新更新时间:2026-11-17 02:59

每分钟刷新已保存的数据。空检查不代表采集异常;新收录可能包含历史论文。AI 导读按新增版本计数。

25,786 已收录论文21,491 AI 相关7,725 有修订112 HF 社区发现

浏览论文库

时间范围跟随排序:版本更新、本站收录或首次发表。最新收录可能包含历史论文。部分信源异常,查看状态 →

找到 2 篇论文 · 按版本更新时间排序上轮扫描起点 2026-11-17 23:19(北京时间)
新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.09060

Fair Selection of Generalized Nash Equilibria: A Comparability Perspective

Sophie Hall, Heinrich H. Nax, Saverio Bolognani

原文摘要

Generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) problems model self-interested agents coupled through their costs and shared constraints, and arise throughout control applications that allocate a scarce common resource. Such problems typically admit a continuum of equilibria, so any implementation must \emph{select} one. This selection is not neutral: it decides how the cost of the shared constraint is distributed among the agents, a decision often expected to be fair. The variational GNE (v-GNE), which charges all agents a uniform shadow price, is the conventional choice and is frequently advocated as fair. Through the lens of \emph{comparability} from social choice theory, we show that the GNE set itself requires no inter-agent comparability of costs, whereas the v-GNE implicitly assumes cardinal unit comparability, one of the stronger notions. We then introduce the fair GNE (f-GNE), which selects an equilibrium by explicitly optimizing a fairness metric matched to the comparability at hand, and give constructive routes to compute it for single-constraint and linear-quadratic games. An electric-vehicle charging game serves as a running example throughout this self-contained tutorial.

cs.GT · eess.SY · math.OC

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2606.23931

Welfarist Control Design - How to fulfill the societal mandate in multi-agent control?

Sophie Hall, Kai Zhang, Ilia Shilov, Heinrich H. Nax, Saverio Bolognani

原文摘要

At the core of most socio-technical systems lies a scarce resource that is allocated among agents: highway lanes, public transit, road space, water rights, energy access, grid capacity, user attention, pollution rights, etc. With further automation of the underlying allocation processes, control engineers are increasingly tasked with making decisive assumptions regarding what society wants. In practice to date, design choices are largely driven by industry norms and conventions rather than a result of conscientiously responsible and ethical design. In this paper, we look at tools available to control engineers to design systems in a more principled manner in order to match the societal mandate. We consider three control design paradigms: online feedback optimization, control of Markov decision processes, and model predictive control. Beginning with aggregating individual agents' preferences into control design objectives, subsequently ensuring and certifying the fulfillment of those specifications, we argue that the feedback nature of control systems enables appropriate allocation of the shared resources in ways hitherto unparalleled.

eess.SY · cs.MA · math.OC