Zhiming Xue, Jianan Liu, Weiran Yan, Aicheng Xie, Jing Yang
原文摘要
We introduce SafeRoute-MAS, a coverage-aware, risk-calibrated procedure that keeps all specialist messages or removes one using only pre-integration information. On a sealed cache of 5,328 committees, its source-compatible operating point gains +1.80 percentage points (95% CI [+1.13, +2.52]) while removing 12.76% of message tokens. We also run 4,580 controlled integrations over a stratified 458-committee sample on a public gpt-oss-120b endpoint. The sample estimate is -0.09 points; design weighting to the original workload gives +0.94 points (95% CI [-1.31, +3.50]) and 18.72% acted-input reduction. A weighted token-matched comparison likewise does not establish a selector advantage (+1.68 points, CI [-1.27, +5.10]). Only 13 of 88 cached non-neutral labels (14.8%) retain direction by repeated-call majority. Expected-corruption UCL is 4.60% after weighting, but only 2 of 11 prespecified marginals pass the support/risk rule. We therefore propose a numerical qualification with Keep-All fallback, applied here retrospectively rather than validated prospectively.
Programs that use a language model as a classifier act on its most probable label. Text injected into the input can move that label to one the attacker chooses, a hijack. A monitor that does not know the attacker's label can read the model's own confidence and raise an alarm when the top probability is low. We test this monitor on AG News topic classification with five systems, three of them served through a provider's API. Pooled over five families of injected text, low confidence ranks hijacked answers above clean ones on four of the five systems (AUROC 0.86-0.90). Ranking them does not stop many of them. A threshold set so that at most 5% of clean answers to separate calibration articles alarm falls among the least confident clean answers, and every more confident hijack passes. In our main gate run on the three API-served systems, the monitor misses 51-70% of the hijacks caused by a plain injected note (per-system point estimates). When the note adds one handwritten sentence that calls the target certain and asks for full probability, the monitor misses 99-100% of the hijacks, although low confidence still ranks them at AUROC 0.70-0.79. Confidence monitors should be tested at their operating alarm rate, against attackers who claim certainty.