跳到正文
研踪PaperTrail

论文库

检索计算机领域论文,按研究方向、作者或关键词筛选。

部分采集异常
正在读取账号与研究记录…

全站更新概况

+1295新增论文
+1026其中 AI 相关
+111已有论文修订
+95新增 AI 导读

arXiv 最近完成扫描:2026-11-17 04:58 · 全站最近入库:2026-11-17 16:10各信源进度 →

统计口径与数据新鲜度

统计 2026-11-16 16:53 — 2026-11-17 16:53(北京时间) · 点击数字查看对应简报;AI 相关包含在新增论文内。

最近完成检查:2026-11-17 04:58最近发现新增版本:2026-11-17 16:10库内论文最新更新时间:2026-11-17 02:59

每分钟刷新已保存的数据。空检查不代表采集异常;新收录可能包含历史论文。AI 导读按新增版本计数。

25,122 已收录论文20,967 AI 相关7,309 有修订112 HF 社区发现

浏览论文库

时间范围跟随排序:版本更新、本站收录或首次发表。最新收录可能包含历史论文。部分信源异常,查看状态 →

找到 3 篇论文 · 按版本更新时间排序上轮扫描起点 2026-11-17 04:57(北京时间)
新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.06294

A.S.E 2.0: Understanding How Repository Context Impacts the Security of LLM-Generated Code

Jiongchi Yu, Keke Lian, Junqing Wang, Zhikang Fan, Zhaoxuan Li, Yongheng Huang, Ziming Zhao, Dong Zhang

原文摘要

Large language model (LLM) coding assistants and agents construct a repository context before generating code. For security-sensitive code, this context decides whether the model sees the project's safeguards (e.g., authorization checks) or insecure code to imitate. However, context construction is designed almost exclusively for functional correctness, and secure-code benchmarks treat the context as fixed, so how repository context affects the security of generated code remains unclear. We construct CASE-Bench, a benchmark of 145 repository-level tasks from real CVEs in 51 projects. Each task runs in Docker, has functional tests and a proof-of-concept exploit validated in both directions, and is annotated with the repository code that enforces or undermines its security. Using CASE-Bench, we compare 13 context construction methods and six controls with six LLMs, edit single context elements, and analyze coding-agent trajectories. We find that (1) functionality-oriented context raises the functional pass rate by up to 8.2 percentage points (pp) but the secure pass rate by at most 3.7 pp, (2) withholding a safeguard lowers the secure pass rate by up to 8.1 pp, while one inserted insecure exemplar raises correct-but-exploitable code by 6.3 pp, and (3) coding agents observe the relevant safeguard in only 27-36% of trajectories. These findings inform security-aware context construction and secure-code evaluation.

cs.CR · cs.AI · cs.SE

版本更新 · v3arXiv:2610.35541

The Agent in the Middle: How AI-Mediated Access Reshapes Web Vulnerability Exploitation

Ruozhao Yang, Jiongchi Yu, Ming Hu, Xiaofei Xie

原文摘要

Web services increasingly expose backend interfaces that let users delegate tasks to AI agents, which invoke service operations directly without navigating websites. This shift changes how existing Web vulnerabilities can be exploited. We investigate these changes through VELA, an executable benchmark covering 44 vulnerabilities across twelve Web application families. The benchmark preserves vulnerable backends and derives agent-facing interfaces from legitimate workflows. We evaluate three commercial agents across multiple interface configurations, using controlled comparisons to separate interface effects from agent behavior and independent oracles to verify attack outcomes. Our results show that the agent realizes every attack that direct interface invocation realizes in the reference configuration, so exploitability is set mainly by the interface: 91% of vulnerabilities remain exploitable under the reference design. Interface restrictions prevent some attacks by removing required operations or limiting input control, while retention remains high across vulnerability classes. No case-level loss in the reference configuration is attributed to agent refusal or input normalization, and in one case the agent completed an attack by supplying calls the attacker omitted. Across the tested configurations, interface design affects exploitability more than agent choice, moving retention from 39% to 95% against at most 4.5 points across agents, but some restrictive interfaces also limit legitimate workflows. Our study provides a systematic empirical account of how agent-mediated access reshapes existing Web vulnerabilities, grounding future Web architecture design in measured security outcomes and trade-offs between reducing attack exposure and preserving legitimate functionality in agent-facing services.

cs.CR · cs.AI · cs.SE

版本更新 · v3arXiv:2610.35532

JANUS: Synthesizing Cross-Layer Defenses Against Web Deserialization Attacks

Ruozhao Yang, Minglang Li, Jiongchi Yu, Xinfeng Li, Xiaofei Xie

原文摘要

Unsafe deserialization turns untrusted data into attacker-controlled execution, and a single vulnerability can admit diverse exploit variants that evade defenses tailored to a known exploit. Existing defenses typically operate at a single enforcement point with limited visibility into the full attack. Combining controls across layers offers complementary protection, but coordinating them to preserve legitimate functionality and adapting them to new variants requires substantial expert effort. We propose JANUS, a red-blue adversarial framework for automated cross-layer defense synthesis. Starting from a known exploit, \sys iteratively refines deployment-specific policies in an isolated offline environment. A black-box attacker probes the current policy for exploit variants using only externally observable feedback. The defender summarizes each verified variant into its security-relevant effects, uses counterfactual replay to separate complementary coverage from redundant enforcement, and jointly selects and scopes controls across layers. Each candidate policy is validated against accumulated exploits and benign workflows. We evaluate JANUS on sixteen vulnerability deployments across six Java and PHP applications against gateway, application, system, and cross-layer defenses. JANUS reduces held-out attack success to 6.2%, compared with 18.8-55.0% for the baselines, fully mitigates 13 of 16 deployments, and preserves 98.4% of benign functionality tests at a 6.9% targeted P95 latency increase.

cs.CR · cs.AI · cs.SE