跳到正文
研踪PaperTrail

论文库

检索计算机领域论文,按研究方向、作者或关键词筛选。

部分采集异常
正在读取账号与研究记录…

全站更新概况

+0新增论文
+0其中 AI 相关
+0已有论文修订
+92新增 AI 导读

arXiv 最近完成扫描:2026-11-23 01:07 · 全站最近入库:2026-11-21 12:19各信源进度 →

统计口径与数据新鲜度

统计 2026-11-22 03:10 — 2026-11-23 03:10(北京时间) · 点击数字查看对应简报;AI 相关包含在新增论文内。

最近完成检查:2026-11-23 01:07最近发现新增版本:2026-11-21 12:19库内论文最新更新时间:2026-11-20 02:59

每分钟刷新已保存的数据。空检查不代表采集异常;新收录可能包含历史论文。AI 导读按新增版本计数。

29,158 已收录论文24,181 AI 相关8,992 有修订112 HF 社区发现

浏览论文库

时间范围跟随排序:版本更新、本站收录或首次发表。最新收录可能包含历史论文。部分信源异常,查看状态 →

找到 1 篇论文 · 按版本更新时间排序上轮扫描起点 2026-11-23 01:05(北京时间)
新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.06350

On Existence and Computational Complexity of Quasi-strict Equilibria

Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Xinhao Nie

原文摘要

Quasi-strict Nash equilibrium, introduced by Harsanyi in 1973, is the Nash equilibrium refinement that requires every pure best response to be played with positive probability. Norde established that any bimatrix game admits a quasi-strict Nash equilibrium. We give a substantially simpler proof of this result that in particular avoids an intricate limit argument used in the final step of the proof by Norde. Our existence proof allows us to positively resolve the outstanding open question of PPAD membership of the problem of computing a quasi-strict Nash equilibrium, thereby settling its precise complexity. In games with three or more players, a quasi-strict Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist, leading to the natural problem of deciding the existence of a quasi-strict Nash equilibrium in a given strategic form game. We show that this problem is $\exists\mathbb{R}$-complete, strengthening a previous NP-hardness result.

cs.GT