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原文摘要

Security tools raise findings across cloud environments, and AI agents now investigate and prioritize them. A finding is still resolved by people: it has to reach the people responsible for fixing it and accountable for the resource it concerns. Ownership is the organizational context that decides who that is. Where recorded, it is declared by hand in configuration management databases or owner tags and goes stale unless kept current; accounts are shared, and automation creates much of the infrastructure. The knowledge sits in work records, code history, audit logs and identity directories, encoded in each organization's own conventions. Recovering it poses four challenges: the signal is scattered across sources, none of them authoritative; the conventions that carry it differ between organizations; reaching an owner takes multi-hop links; and those related to a resource differ in the strength of their relation. We define ownership as a set of entities, people or teams, each related to the resource by one of five patterns ordered by strength. We present a reference architecture for agentic ownership attribution that derives ownership from these records instead of declaring it: it profiles an organization offline into tested signal procedures and an ownership playbook, then attributes each resource with a coordinator agent and parallel investigators, with confidence computed by rules. On 100 resources of 50 Amazon Web Services (AWS) resource types in one organization, we pool the architecture's candidates with those of an unprimed general-purpose agent and verify every evidence piece against the records. The architecture reaches 92.1% weighted recall and 86.6% weighted precision, against 54.8% and 77.4%, at 0.55 times the agent's cost per unit of coverage. The difference lies in people who build and change resources without an explicit owner, found through work records and code history.