Do Coding Agents Deceive Us? Detecting and Preventing Cheating via Capped Evaluation with Randomized Tests
Thanawat Lodkaew, Johannes Ackermann, Soichiro Nishimori, Nontawat Charoenphakdee, Masashi Sugiyama, Takashi Ishida
原文摘要
A growing failure mode in agent evaluation and training is that models can achieve high evaluation scores (e.g., test pass rates) by exploiting shortcuts instead of solving the intended task, making these scores deceptive. This makes evaluation scores unreliable as measures of true task-solving ability. We propose CapCode, a framework for constructing coding datasets with randomized tests whose best achievable non-cheating score is deliberately capped below 100%. This capped-score design gives evaluation scores a clearer interpretation: scores substantially above the cap are implausible and therefore provide evidence of cheating. To prevent cheating, we propose CapReward, a reward design based on the CapCode principle to discourage optimization beyond the cap. Experiments across multiple datasets show that CapCode detects cheating while preserving performance ranking of models, and CapReward reduces cheating behavior, yielding models that better follow the intended task specification.
cs.LG · cs.AI · cs.CL · stat.ME