Johan Obando-Ceron, Walter Mayor, Michael Dennis, Aaron Courville, Pablo Samuel Castro
原文摘要
Unsupervised Environment Design (UED) approaches train reinforcement learning (RL) agents on diverse curricula that may evolve with their capabilities. While prior work has largely focused on how these curricula are constructed, we study whether their students remain trainable under the resulting distributions. Across multiple UED mechanisms, environment complexities, and extended training horizons, we identify recurring learner-side pathologies, including parameter growth, degraded value--outcome ordering, and loss of representational diversity, that accompany stagnation and performance degradation. These findings connect limitations in UED to optimization failures previously identified in conventional deep RL, while showing how adaptive curricula couple the learner's optimization state to its future training distribution. Controlled interventions show that mitigating selected pathologies improves learning. Stabilizing the learner improves long-horizon performance and zero-shot generalization without changing the curriculum rule or increasing environment interaction. Our results establish learner trainability as a complementary design principle for UED. Effective curricula require students that remain capable of learning from the distributions they produce.
Deep reinforcement learning (RL) policies are known to be vulnerable to adversarial perturbations to their observations, similar to adversarial examples for classifiers. However, an attacker is not usually able to directly modify another agent's observations. This might lead one to wonder: is it possible to attack an RL agent simply by choosing an adversarial policy acting in a multi-agent environment so as to create natural observations that are adversarial? We demonstrate the existence of adversarial policies in zero-sum games between simulated humanoid robots with proprioceptive observations, against state-of-the-art victims trained via self-play to be robust to opponents. The adversarial policies reliably win against the victims but generate seemingly random and uncoordinated behavior. We find that these policies are more successful in high-dimensional environments, and induce substantially different activations in the victim policy network than when the victim plays against a normal opponent. Videos are available at https://adversarialpolicies.github.io/.