Tokenizers are usually treated as fixed preprocessing tools, but they are trained on text and can retain traces of that text in their vocabularies. We ask whether a BPE tokenizer can reveal if a candidate dataset was part of its training corpus. The key observation is simple. Rare strings become tokens only when enough corpus frequency pushes them over the merge threshold. This suggests that membership signal should appear in rare tokens used by the candidate dataset, rather than in the order in which merges were made. We formalize this under a threshold model of BPE inclusion, showing that the likelihood-ratio test assigns its largest weights to tokens that are rare in the background but frequent in the candidate dataset. The same model suggests that merge rank and merge-graph position should not add a first-order membership signal once token existence and dataset frequency are known. We instantiate this view as RTAM-Fusion, which calibrates rare-token mass with shadow tokenizers and combines signals across rarity levels. On the tokenizer membership benchmark, RTAM-Fusion improves AUC and balanced accuracy over Vocabulary Overlap while using fewer shadow tokenizers. Existing defenses also continue to leak membership signal against adaptive attackers at production vocabulary sizes. Code: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/RTAM-Fusion-F7EE/
Christos Ziakas Imperial College London, Nicholas Loo, Nishita Jain, Alessandra Russo Imperial College London
原文摘要
Automated red-teaming has emerged as a scalable approach for auditing Large Language Models (LLMs) prior to deployment, yet existing approaches lack mechanisms to efficiently adapt to model-specific vulnerabilities at inference. We introduce Red-Bandit, a red-teaming framework that adapts online to identify and exploit model failure modes under distinct attack styles (e.g., manipulation, slang). Red-Bandit post-trains a set of parameter-efficient LoRA experts, each specialized for a particular attack style, using reinforcement learning that rewards the generation of unsafe prompts via a rule-based safety model. At inference, a multi-armed bandit policy dynamically selects among these attack-style experts based on the target model’s response safety, balancing exploration and exploitation. Red-Bandit outperforms state-of-the-art methods on AdvBench and HarmBench, achieving higher attack success rates under sufficient exploration budgets (ASR@10), while generating more human-readable adversarial prompts (lower perplexity). In addition, Red-Bandit’s bandit policy serves as a diagnostic tool for identifying model-specific vulnerabilities by indicating which attack styles most effectively elicit harmful behaviors.
cs.CL
Proceedings of the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers) · 2026 · 正式发表