Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have emerged as a powerful paradigm for general-purpose robot manipulation; however, their transition to real-world environments reveals vulnerabilities to minor environmental perturbations. We propose FLARE, an optimization framework that exploits these vulnerabilities via targeted illuminations, causing critical disruption of baseline tasks. While adversarial training is the standard countermeasure, we identify a critical and previously underestimated defensive pitfall: naive data augmentations condition VLA models to largely discard color as noise, biasing their visual perception toward shape cues. We expose this degradation through a diagnostic grayscale evaluation, in which a naively defended model maintains high success rates on grayscale inputs, while its success rate on benign, color-dependent real-world tasks drops to at most 48.8%, compared with 78.8% for the undefended SmolVLA baseline. To address this, we propose ChromaGuard, a chroma-preserving adversarial training method. On a physical 6-DoF robotic platform using SmolVLA, we demonstrate that ChromaGuard achieves 95.0% and 88.8% success rates in benign and attacked color-dependent tasks, respectively. Demo videos are available at https://keio-csg.github.io/ChromaGuard/.
Yukina Nakagawa, Takami Sato, Ken Kobayashi, Kazuhide Nakata
原文摘要
Robustness verification is essential for ensuring the safety and security of neural networks, but current methods focus heavily on norm-ball attacks, which do not adequately model typical real-world threats that present physical perturbations, known as patch attacks. A naive approach requires computationally prohibitive enumeration of all possible patch positions. To address the challenge, we propose a novel neural network verification method specialized to the patch-attack threat. Instead of enumerating patch locations, we first model the patch attack with group-wise sparsity and formulate its verification methods as a mixed-integer semidefinite program (MISDP) by applying SDP relaxation to the neural network. We then propose three relaxations, including Group-Lasso relaxation, that remove the integer variables while preserving the sparse, group-wise structure of the original attack, enabling substantially efficient verification. Our empirical analysis demonstrates that the proposed relaxations require less than 3% of the computation time of the original MISDP, while the Group-Lasso relaxation incurs only a 0.34\% average increase in the objective value over the original formulation. Furthermore, Group-Lasso achieves a verified rate of 91%, compared with under 70% for prior methods.