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arXiv 最近完成扫描:2026-11-16 01:34 · 全站最近入库:2026-11-16 21:56各信源进度 →

统计口径与数据新鲜度

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新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.14317

MammothDP:面向可信硬件与无泄漏超参数的私有提升决策树

MammothDP: Private Boosted Decision Trees Ready for Trusted Hardware and Leakage-free Hyperparameters

Moritz Kirschte, Thorsten Peinemann, Kari Kostiainen, Jan Wichelmann, Thomas Eisenbarth, Esfandiar Mohammadi

AI 速读 基于摘要

作者提出 MammothDP,将 S-BDT 梯度提升决策树与隐私过滤器、时序侧信道加固和 TEE 部署结合,并引入无隐私开销的早停准则与改进的回滚保护。

cs.CR · cs.DB · cs.LG

查看原文摘要

Data spaces like the European Health Data Space (EHDS) require the protection of sensitive data in studies during the data's processing and the study's release alike. In this work, we investigate how to implement this mandate using established trusted execution environments (TEEs) and timing side-channel hardening to protect the processing even under a compromised server, and the state-of-the-art differential privacy (DP) notion to protect the release of studies on tabular data. This combined setup could seem to complete the picture, but in fact raises unexpected security challenges that we mitigate by introducing MammothDP: a significant milestone towards a holistic machine learning system based on the recent gradient boosted decision tree learner S-BDT that is provably DP if used within a privacy filter, timing side-channel hardened, and deployed on a TEE. To achieve a strong privacy-utility tradeoff, we introduce two novel components: an early stopping criterion that adaptively selects the number of trees without any privacy overhead, and an improved rollback protection that is no longer vulnerable under timing side-channel attacks.

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.02788

Rethinking Neural Decompilation: Candidate Selection as the Hidden Bottleneck

Felix Mächtle, Gautham Sriram, Manjil Neupane, Nils Loose, Thomas Eisenbarth

原文摘要

Reverse engineering obfuscated binaries is a core task in malware analysis and software security auditing. While neural decompilers based on Large Language Models (LLMs) have improved the readability and functional fidelity of recovered code over heuristic tools such as Ghidra and IDA Pro, a substantial gap remains between best-sample performance and practical single-output accuracy, particularly under code obfuscation. We study this gap through the lens of candidate generation and candidate selection. Using the LLM4Decompile architecture, we show that ground-truth tokens lie within the model's top-five next-token predictions in 95.6% of positions on average and that multi-sample decoding reaches a pass@100 of 93% on HumanEval-Decompile, indicating that correct reconstructions are typically already present in the model's sampling space. We then evaluate a generate-then-select pipeline that ranks 100 candidates per input with text-, syntax-, embedding-, consensus-, and likelihood-based selectors. Negative perplexity emerges as the strongest static selector on HumanEval-Decompile (73.3% pass@1), while execution-guided selection nearly closes the oracle gap on ExeBench (86.3% pass@1). Combined with one epoch of fine-tuning on our newly released ExeBench-Obfuscated dataset containing 362,647 obfuscated OLLVM samples, the same pipeline increases the pass@1 rate for obfuscated binaries to 88.8%, directly contradicting prior claims that released LLM4Decompile checkpoints are unsuitable for obfuscated inputs.

cs.CR · cs.AI

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2606.09697

PsychoSafe: Eliciting Psychologically-Informed Refusals in Large Language Models

Gianluca Barmina, Federico Torrielli, Sven Harms, Jacob Nielsen, Flavia Filesi, Felix Mächtle, Stine Lyngsø Beltoft, Peter Schneider-Kamp 等 11 位作者

原文摘要

Large language models (LLMs) routinely face requests that should be refused, creating a trade-off between helpfulness and harm prevention. However, refusals themselves can be helpful. In high-risk interactions involving crisis, coercion, or escalating intent, blunt non-compliance may prevent direct harm while still failing to support the needs of the person behind the request. We present PsychoSafe, a psychologically-informed refusal framework that reframes refusal as structured supportive communication grounded in evidence-based intervention strategies. To develop PsychoSafe, we construct a corpus of 8,019 prompt-response pairs spanning five psychologically salient risk domains and apply prompting and parameter-efficient fine-tuning to Qwen 3.5 27B. On a balanced validation set of 500 prompts, evaluated with an LLM judge and validated through human ratings, PsychoSafe prompting improves overall refusal quality by 28.1% over a generic baseline, with particularly strong gains in external resource referral (+46.8%) and psychological grounding (+34.8%), while preserving downstream performance on non-refusal tasks. Fine-tuning achieves near-perfect refusal and resource-referral rates but reduces response relevance. Additional evaluations on SORRY-Bench and XSTest show strong in-domain robustness but limited out-of-domain generalization, suggesting that future work should diversify fine-tuning data to help models apply interventions selectively rather than schematically.

cs.CL

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2610.34923

Attack logics, not outputs: Concept-based Property Attacks for Shortcut Elimination in Neural Networks

Raik Dankworth, Felix Mächtle, Thomas Eisenbarth, Gesina Schwalbe

原文摘要

Deep neural networks (NNs) for computer vision are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, such that minuscule malicious changes to inputs may induce unintuitive outputs. One key approach to verify and mitigate such robustness issues is to falsify expected output behavior, which enables local robustness guarantees and adversarial training. Due to the black-box nature of NNs, current attacks only falsify a class of the final output, such as flipping from $\text{stop_sign}$ to $\neg \text{stop_sign}$. In this work we argue that robustness analysis should focus more generally on logical inconsistencies in concept-level reasoning rather than solely on output misclassification. We formalize this perspective through concept-based properties, i.e., constraints over human-interpretable concepts such as $\text{red} \land \text{octogonal} \implies \text{stop_sign}$ and study the falsification of such properties as a principled form of adversarial attack. Furthermore, an implementation of concept-based properties on already trained NNs is proposed using techniques from concept-based explainable artificial intelligence (C-XAI). For that we formally prove that attacks on concept-based properties are expected to have a reduced search space compared to simple class falsification, whilst arguably be more aligned with intuitive robustness targets. The practical effectiveness of our approach for logically informed adversarial training is shown in an empirical study across multiple models and datasets, including both vision and a security-relevant code processing task. Our results demonstrate that concept-level falsification generalizes classical adversarial attacks: Retraining on our novel attacks maintains robustness gains as compared to classical adversarial retraining whilst better eliminating semantic biases.

cs.CR · cs.LG