When Connectivity Is Not Enough: Cross-Layer Attacks on UAV C2 over 5G
Wagner Comin Sonaglio, Ágney Lopes Roth Ferraz, André Elias Melo, Murray Evangelista de Souza, Sidnei Barbieri, Henrique Curi de Miranda, Guevara Noubir, Lourenço Alves Pereira Júnior
AI 速读 基于摘要
作者在可复现的 Open5GS/UERANSIM 测试床上用三种威胁模型展示:5G 注册、PDU 会话与 IP 可达等连通性指标不能保证 UAV C2 闭环控制的安全。
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Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operations increasingly use 5G standalone (SA) networks for command and control (C2) between the UAV and the ground control station (GCS). The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) has specified mechanisms for authentication and authorization of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in this architectural setting. As a result, operators may treat registration state, Protocol Data Unit (PDU) session status, and IP reachability as evidence that the C2 path is available. In practice, however, these connectivity indicators alone do not guarantee that closed-loop control remains operationally safe. Attacks can degrade UAS C2 when timeliness degrades under shared User Plane contention, mobility continuity fails during Control Plane instability, or command integrity is violated at a trusted next-generation Node B (gNodeB). Such failures undermine connectivity as the central security indicator for UAV operations. In this paper, we demonstrate these issues using three distinct threat models on a reproducible Open5GS and UERANSIM testbed that carries Micro Air Vehicle Link (MAVLink) over the 5G User Plane, and we use a commercial Nokia core to ground deployment assumptions. We address timeliness, availability, and integrity through experiments in which attack success is defined as forcing an unsafe closed-loop state without a clean disconnect. We observe stale telemetry and heavy-tailed delay under co-tenant User Plane contention, failsafe after handover under Control Plane instability, and navigation hijacking after command rewriting at a compromised gNodeB. We further discuss why each threat model arises and evaluate mitigations for these cross-layer failures. Across the study, we disclosed five robustness issues, all with assigned CVEs.
Cyber threat intelligence (CTI) encoded in STIX and structured according to the MITRE ATT&CK framework has become a global reference for describing adversary behavior. However, ATT&CK was designed as a descriptive knowledge base rather than a procedural model. We therefore ask whether its structured artifacts contain sufficient behavioral detail to support multi-stage adversary emulation. Through systematic measurements of the ATT&CK Enterprise bundle, we show that campaign objects encode just fragmented slices of behavior. Only 35.6% of techniques appear in at least one campaign, and neither clustering nor sequence analysis reveals any reusable behavioral structure under technique overlap or LCS-based analyses. Intrusion sets cover a broader portion of the technique space, yet omit the procedural semantics required to transform behavioral knowledge into executable chains, including ordering, preconditions, and environmental assumptions. These findings reveal a procedural semantic gap in current CTI standards: they describe what adversaries do, but not exactly how that behavior was operationalized. To assess how far this gap can be bridged in practice, we introduce a three-stage methodology that translates behavioral information from structured CTI into executable steps and makes the necessary environmental assumptions explicit. We demonstrate its viability by instantiating the resulting steps as operations in the MITRE Caldera framework. Case studies of ShadowRay and Soft Cell show that structured CTI can enable the emulation of multi-stage APT campaigns, but only when analyst-supplied parameters and assumptions are explicitly recorded. This, in turn, exposes the precise points at which current standards fail to support automation. Our results clarify the boundary between descriptive and machine-actionable CTI for adversary emulation.