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版本更新 · v2arXiv:2609.12263

A First-Principles Evaluation of Graph-Based Network Intrusion Detection Systems

Rui Zhao, Wajih Ul Hassan

原文摘要

Graph-based network intrusion detection systems (GIDS) report strong benchmark detection metrics, but those metrics establish little about deployability. We approach the problem from first principles: rather than inheriting the preprocessing, windowing, and thresholding conventions of each published system, we ask what a controlled comparison requires and impose it uniformly. The result is GIDS-Eval, an evaluation framework that decomposes a GIDS into six interchangeable stages and turns those conventions into explicit experimental variables, so reported performance can be attributed to individual stages instead of whole pipelines. We survey nine representative GIDS, reimplement five of them within GIDS-Eval, and evaluate them on four datasets under one matched protocol. We identify nine recurring evaluation gaps and quantify the impact of each: two crafted edges achieve full evasion against three of the eight detector-dataset pairs with anything to hide; the snapshot window alone accounts for a mean 38.3% relative swing in average precision (AP); aligning preprocessing across systems moves AP by up to 61.8 percentage points for a single detector; and none of the 18 detector-dataset pairs we replay can alert as events arrive. We introduce GIDS-Lite, an encoder-free control built in the same framework, which ranks first by AP on two of the four datasets at up to 575$\times$ lower runtime. Architectural complexity is therefore not a consistent driver of detection quality under our matched protocol on current benchmarks, but it does enlarge the runtime, calibration, and attack surfaces operators must defend.

cs.CR

新论文 · v1arXiv:2610.37872

Set an Exploit to Catch an Exploit: Compiling Public Proofs of Concept into Threat Hunting Rules

Muhammad Shoaib, Alexander Suh, Joshua Andrew Tomiak, Wajih Ul Hassan

原文摘要

Public exploit code for a newly disclosed vulnerability usually appears before any published rule that detects its exploitation. Of the 45 CVEs we evaluate, 37 ever received a Sigma, Elastic or Splunk rule; in 33 the exploit came first, by a median of 22 days. Analysts still write every rule by hand. We present Encore, which compiles a public Python proof-of-concept exploit (PoC) into CVE-specific hunting rules over a web service's existing logs, without running it. Encore rests on the PoC Behavior Alignment Principle: a PoC performs the exploit, so its code already provides a rule's HTTP requests, payloads and host operations. That is hard to act on: a PoC is written against libraries and runs on the attacker's machine, while the target's web-server, proxy and host logs record only what arrived and what it did. Encore closes the gap with a map from library calls to the operations they cause, built once per library, keeping only the operations visible on the target. For 12 of the 45, Encore's rule states the exploit's own payload fragment or host operation, which is evidence of the exploit itself, and not of traffic to its endpoint. On matched controls it separates that exploit from the same request with a harmless value, and it raises no alerts across 27,081 legitimate and crawl requests. We never compile the exploit that produced the logs. Most are Splunk's public attack data, recorded by a third party. Without reading a single log, Encore's rules find 43 of the 45. Splunk's log-tested rules cover 30 of the 45, and Encore finds 28 of those, plus all 10 CVEs without an ESCU rule. Where Splunk's rules alert on 20 wrong CVE pairs, Encore's alert on only 2. Hunting can start as soon as a PoC is public, and rules can raise an alert when it provides a payload or host operation.

cs.CR