Songtao Wei, Yi Li, Zhikai Li, Xu Hu, Yuede Ji, Guanpeng Li, Feng Chen, Carl Yang 等 10 位作者
Large reasoning models, such as OpenAI o1 and DeepSeek-R1, tend to become increasingly verbose as their reasoning capabilities improve. These inflated Chain-of-Thought (CoT) trajectories often exceed what the underlying problems require, wasting compute, latency, and context budgets. While introducing length-based efficiency rewards during reinforcement learning offers a natural remedy, existing methods struggle with two fundamental challenges: the optimal balance between correctness and efficiency is non-stationary throughout training, and intrinsic reasoning budgets vary drastically across problems. Relying on static reward weights and global length constraints inevitably forces a compromise between degraded accuracy and unrealized compression. To overcome these limitations, we propose LEAD (Length-Efficient Adaptive and Dynamic reasoning), a method that replaces static heuristics with online, self-adaptive mechanisms. LEAD dynamically calibrates the correctness--efficiency trade-off at each step using a Potential-Scaled Instability, directing optimization capacity to the most informative learning signal. Furthermore, it estimates an adaptive per-problem target length online based on the model's own correct rollouts, applying a symmetric efficiency reward that penalizes both overthinking and over-compression. Evaluated on five mathematical reasoning benchmarks, LEAD achieves the highest accuracy and Accuracy-Efficiency Score among RL-trained efficient-reasoning methods in our matched comparisons while producing substantially shorter outputs than the base model.
Tushar Nayan, Pratik Poudel, Qian Lou, Yuede Ji, Jason Liu, Ruimin Sun
Large Language Models (LLMs) rely on proprietary system prompts to enforce task directives, safety policies, and access controls. These prompts are vulnerable to query-based leakage attacks, where black-box adversaries extract confidential instructions through adaptive, multi-turn interactions. Existing defenses often assess queries independently, missing malicious behavior that emerges across interactions. We present AdvGuard, a model-agnostic framework for detecting and mitigating system prompt leakage. AdvGuard models cross-query relationships using a bounded semantic interaction graph, statistically filters candidate components, and converts them into line graphs for graph convolutional network (GCN) classification. This approach captures multi-hop patterns in query similarity that distinguish coordinated extraction from benign workflows. A lightweight prompt-level detector provides protection before sufficient interaction history accumulates, and the framework supports black-box LLM deployments. In mixed-query evaluations, AdvGuard improves recall by up to 36% over the strongest baseline while maintaining a false positive rate of at most 3.4%. In multi-turn workloads, it achieves 97.23%-99.1% F1 with 100% recall. Leave-one-attack-family-out tests yield 99.98% mean recall and 99.99% mean F1, with no observed false positives. Integrated into the adaptive PLeak and LeakAgent attack loops, AdvGuard limits exact-match leakage to 0.00-0.01 and substring-match leakage to 0.01-0.09 across evaluated victim models. These results demonstrate robust detection of unseen attack families and substantially reduced prompt reconstruction.