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新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.07853

CANMentor: A Large-Small Model Collaboration Framework for CAN Bus Intrusion Detection

Zhiquan Liu, Haolin Gao, Bo Wu, Jingjing Guo, Heng Sun, Jianfeng Ma

原文摘要

The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus lacks built-in security mechanisms, making real-time intrusion detection necessary. However, resource and latency constraints limit vehicle-side intrusion detection systems (IDSs) to lightweight models, whose detection performance and generalization can degrade under non-independent and identically distributed (non-IID) data. Meanwhile, uploading original CAN messages to the cloud for more powerful model inference risks exposing sensitive vehicle information. We propose CANMentor, a large-small model collaboration framework in which a cloud-side large language model (LLM) teacher supervises vehicle-side lightweight IDS models for CAN bus intrusion detection. Each vehicle first performs local inference, and a privacy-aware generator then produces proxies from the original CAN messages for cloud-side teacher inference to protect data privacy. The vehicle uses the teacher prediction only when the response arrives within a prescribed latency bound and otherwise retains the local prediction; all returned teacher logits are converted into soft targets for periodic knowledge distillation. On non-IID partitions of the ROAD dataset and the HCRL Car-Hacking dataset, knowledge distillation yields maximum relative Macro F1 improvements of 25.01% and 20.79%, respectively. Teacher predictions also improve detection accuracy for CAN messages near the local decision boundary by 38.71-42.00 percentage points.

cs.CR

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2602.22724

AgentSentry: Mitigating Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents via Temporal Causal Diagnostics and Context Purification

Tian Zhang, Yiwei Xu, Juan Wang, Keyan Guo, Xiaoyang Xu, Bowen Xiao, Quanlong Guan, Jinlin Fan 等 11 位作者

原文摘要

Tool-augmented large language model (LLM) agents aggregate dialogue history, tool outputs, and retrieved content into an accumulated runtime state to complete multi-step tasks. This execution model exposes agents to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, in which attacker-controlled instructions embedded in external artifacts enter the agent state and later influence tool use. Multi-turn IPI is especially challenging because injected content can persist across steps and trigger unauthorized state-changing actions only after merging with user intent. This creates a source-attribution problem: existing inference-time defenses can often detect suspicious behavior but do not directly distinguish whether a pending action is supported by the user task or influenced by injected content. They therefore resort to conservative blocking, termination, or broad filtering. We propose AgentSentry, an inference-time defense that operationalizes temporal causal diagnostics through boundary-local counterfactual re-executions at tool-return boundaries. It substitutes the mediator under a restored snapshot, records whether the pending proposal survives, and aggregates user-view and probe scores across adjacent boundaries. When a proposal is mediator-sensitive, AgentSentry purifies the implicated mediator content while preserving task-relevant evidence and resumes execution from the sanitized state. We evaluate AgentSentry on AgentDojo across four task suites, three IPI attack families, and three black-box LLM backbones. It records no observed successful attack in the evaluated cases (ASR = 0%) and achieves an average Utility Under Attack (UA) of 76.10%. Over the strongest evaluated baseline, it improves average UA by 1.84--7.60 percentage points, with benign FPRs of 2.06%--5.15%. We further evaluate long-horizon and adaptive attacks, imperfect purification, runtime overhead, and an OpenClaw case study.

cs.CR · cs.AI