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arXiv 最近完成扫描:2026-11-15 00:32 · 全站最近入库:2026-11-14 15:09各信源进度 →

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版本更新 · v2arXiv:2607.07652

AI Search as an Information Intermediary: Clickstream Evidence on Web Traffic

Qiaoni Shi, Kai Gu, Kai Zhu

原文摘要

AI search retrieves web information to ground generated answers. We study this new information intermediary using U.S. desktop clickstream data observing use alongside referrals during ChatGPT Search's rollout. Referrals accompany 5.4% of ChatGPT sessions versus 31.1% of Google queries. Ad-supported sites receive a smaller share of ChatGPT than Google referrals, while reference and technical sites receive larger shares. Conventional searches (Google, Bing, Yahoo) decline after ChatGPT adoption, sooner when adoption follows ChatGPT Search's expansion to users without accounts. Among existing users, that expansion raises ChatGPT use; conventional searches show no detectable overall change but fall among households with lower prior search activity. These findings suggest AI search can reshape open-web traffic through its own referrals and changes in conventional search.

cs.CY · cs.AI · econ.GN

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.16657

Price co-movement and price information diverge across Nordic electricity zones after the energy crisis

My Thi Diem Phan, Tuyen Trung Truong, Hoai Phuong Ha, Dat Thanh Nguyen

原文摘要

After the 2021-2022 energy crisis, day-ahead prices in Nordic bidding zones no longer move together. We ask whether this divergence also changes the information carried by prices. The answer matters for integrating variable renewable energy (VRE), because it can help identify where wind and solar forecasts are worth producing, publishing, and using. We measured the co-movement of each Norwegian and Swedish zone with Germany-Luxembourg (DE-LU) in 2018-2025. We then used a single model, selected on 2024 data, to forecast 2025 prices at 11:00 on the previous day and tested which inputs improved accuracy in each zone. The zones moved alike until 2019, but co-movement diverged in Sweden in 2020 and in Norway in 2021, and the split has persisted. In 2024, four southern zones co-moved strongly with DE-LU (intraday correlations of 0.54-0.71), while four northern zones co-moved weakly (0.25-0.30). Yet price information did not follow this split. Previous-day neighbouring prices reduced mean absolute error by at most 2.2% in any zone, equally in coupled and isolated zones. Removing the transmission system operators' wind and solar forecasts increased mean absolute error by at most 6% in Norway, 8-16% in Sweden, and 31% in DE-LU, and the ordering held in 2024. Within Norway, the value of these forecasts showed no detectable dependence on reservoir filling. The divergence in co-movement was therefore not matched by a divergence in price information, which differed mainly between national generation systems. Thus, a zone's coupling to the continent does not indicate the value of VRE forecasts there.

econ.GN · cs.LG · stat.AP

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.16471

Accuracy Is Not Welfare: Evaluating AI Buyers under Strategic Price Complexity in a Synthetic Duopoly

Ning Jiaqu

原文摘要

AI buying agents may alter sellers' incentives as well as consumers' decisions. In a synthetic duopoly, we evaluate price-comparison pipelines on a fixed menu and in empirical correlated-equilibrium games. Calculator assistance selects an optimal offer 84.00% of the time, versus 68.57% under verified-total disclosure, yet disclosure has a 20.14-unit higher consumer-worst equilibrium surplus. A frozen-strategy holdout comparison favors disclosure, while re-solving equilibria under scenario resampling produces a range spanning zero. These model-based results show why accuracy, loss severity, seller incentives, and welfare incidence require separate measurement.

cs.GT · econ.GN · q-fin.CP

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.16058

Human Capital in Context: What Employment Survival Reveals About Worker-Firm Match

Jung Ho Choi, Mario Milone

原文摘要

There is no best worker in general, only a best worker for a particular firm. We develop a measure of worker-firm match quality that treats fit as a property of the pair, learned from the survival of employment relationships. A two-tower neural network embeds workers, from their career histories and current positions, and firms, from their characteristics and business descriptions, into a common space, and match quality is the cosine similarity of the two vectors. The measure takes its functional form from the skill-weights model of firm-specific human capital, and its only estimated objective, a separation hazard, from the view of the job match as an experience good. Estimated on more than a billion person-periods covering 101 million workers and 8.4 million firms, a 0.1 increase in match quality lowers the odds of separation by 48%. About a quarter of the variance of match quality is specific to the worker-firm pair, which worker-, firm-, and occupation-level measures set to zero by construction. Workers earn more when better matched, especially early in a relationship, and firms whose workforces score higher grow faster, become more profitable, and are issued more, and more valuable, patents over the next five years than their industry peers. Because it scores pairs that never formed, the measure also predicts where movers go, and acquirers record a larger share of the price as goodwill when the target's workers would fit the acquirer better than they fit the target.

cs.LG · cs.AI · econ.GN

版本更新 · v3arXiv:2502.21037

The amplifier effect of artificial agents in social contagion

Mingmin Feng, Eric Hitz, Luca Lazzaro, Radu Tanase, René Algesheimer, Manuel S. Mariani

原文摘要

Individuals and organizations increasingly consider delegating decision-making to AI agents, which may significantly alter social contagion dynamics. We ask whether artificial agents exhibit different adoption thresholds from those of human subjects when making decisions and, if so, how such differences may affect the spread of social contagions. To answer these questions, we conduct two choice experiments - recently administered to human participants - with artificial agents powered by large language models (LLMs). Across two domains and five LLMs, artificial agents exhibit systematically lower adoption thresholds than human subjects. Simulations of diffusion calibrated with the experimental findings show that, holding network structure fixed, even a modest share of artificial agents leads to higher total adoption. Our findings suggest that the presence of artificial agents in social networks can alter diffusion.

cs.SI · econ.GN · physics.soc-ph

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.15017

Beyond Named Mechanisms: Economic Institutions as a Design Space for Artificial Agents

Nikolos Gurney, Fred Morstatter

原文摘要

Multiagent research inherited its economic vocabulary of auctions, markets, prices, bargaining, and matching from a single observed case: human societies. Those institutions bundle identity, competence, execution, ownership, commitment, and settlement in ways that suit agents whose minds are private, who learn rather than copy skills, and who each persist as one person. Engineered agents need not share any of these constraints, making the list of familiar institutions look less like the entirety of economic organization and more like a sample from a larger, unmapped space. We sketch one way to make that space concrete: a provisional chart that records each institution, separately from the agents that run it, as a typed structure over positions, rights and duties, allocation, information, time, state, process, value, and external recognition. In this chart, named institutions become overlapping regions rather than fixed points, neighboring families separate along a few coordinates, and the gaps between them become places to search. We show what the shift in perspective buys with a simulation in which one technical act, copying an agent's competence, is institutionalized as a new independent supplier, as licensed capacity that creates no new participant, and as the splitting of one economic position into successors that inherit some obligations and not others. In a paired task, all three produce an identical technical trace despite differing in who exists, who owns the copy, who is obligated, and who gets paid. We close with a research program: building a principled chart of institution space, mapping how its implementable region shifts with agent capacities, and revising the chart wherever engineered agents expose distinctions it cannot express.

cs.MA · cs.AI · cs.GT · econ.GN

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.14938

When Does a Recommendation Spark Curiosity? Theory, Measurement, and Field Evidence

Pan Li, Alexander Tuzhilin

原文摘要

Curiosity, the drive to close the gap between what one knows and what one wants to know, pulls consumers beyond their familiar content, sustains engagement, and breaks them out of the filter bubbles of repetitive, relevance-only recommendations. Despite its importance, curiosity is hardly incorporated into modern recommender systems for lack of a formal measure. The information-gap theory of curiosity provides no formal quantitative model that a recommender system can operate on, and existing proxy metrics do not accurately measure the curiosity that a recommended item evokes. To fill this research gap, we formalize the information-gap theory into five axioms of curiosity and construct the canonical formulation of a computational measure of the curiosity that a recommended item evokes in a consumer. We validate our curiosity measure through a survey-based study, in which it matches consumers' self-reported curiosity and outperforms alternative proxy metrics. We subsequently build a curiosity-aware recommender system that incorporates this measure into the utility function design, and we show through offline experiments on three real-world datasets that it significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art methods. Furthermore, we conduct a large-scale online controlled experiment at a major video-streaming platform in Asia, where we show that our method significantly increases click-through rate, video views, and time spent over the latest production system, leading to tangible economic impact for the company. Our method has since been deployed on the platform and remains in operation. Our findings establish consumer curiosity as a measurable and actionable objective for recommender systems, with important managerial implications for digital platforms to recommend what consumers wonder about.

econ.GN · cs.IR · cs.LG

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2609.21439

People escalate against a competitor labelled human and hold back against one labelled an optimising machine

Vinicius Ferraz, Leon Houf

原文摘要

People increasingly compete against AI agents, and organisations decide what to tell them about these opponents. We distinguish an opponent effect, specific to the system faced, from an information effect, a property of the disclosure. In a preregistered, deception-free experiment (N = 1,395), we crossed what participants were told about their opponent with whom they faced in a live all-pay auction in which escalation arises from the incentives. Holding the opponent fixed, being told a human was or might be the opponent raised the median price by 6.7% of the prize value, and being told an optimising machine might be lowered it by 8.8%. Facing an AI agent lowered prices and made it rarer that both players finished with positive earnings. Exploratory analyses indicate that the labels changed how often people raised again while already ahead, not how often they responded when behind. Describing an AI competitor is not behaviourally neutral.

cs.HC · econ.GN

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.14708

The Rebundling of Freelance Work in the AI Age

Caroline Chin, Shagun Kala, Nadav Kunievsky, Teng Liu, Alex Martin Richmond, Carl Shan

原文摘要

This paper examines how freelance work is changing in the AI era. We compare the activities people undertake in ChatGPT with the work clients request on Upwork, an online freelance platform, and examine how clients combine tasks into projects. We find that activities more prevalent in ChatGPT tend to lose marketplace share on Upwork, while those less prevalent tend to gain share. Within AI-related work, demand is becoming more diverse, and job postings combine tasks that were rarely requested together before the generative AI era. AI-related postings also have substantially larger project budgets and involve more hours of work, while differences in hourly rates are small. Together, these findings suggest that AI is reshaping not only which tasks clients outsource, but also how they combine tasks into larger, higher-value projects.

econ.GN · cs.AI · cs.CY

版本更新 · v3arXiv:2511.09454

Individualized Algorithmic Advice as a Strategic Signal on Competitive Markets

Tobias R. Rebholz, Maxwell Uphoff, Christian H. R. Bernges, Florian Scholten

原文摘要

As algorithms increasingly mediate competitive decision-making, their influence extends beyond individual outcomes to shaping strategic market dynamics. In our experiment, we examined how algorithmic advice affects human behavior in a classic economic game with a unique, non-collusive, and analytically traceable equilibrium. Participants (N = 129) played a Cournot quantity competition with equilibrium-aligned or strategically biased algorithmic recommendations. While individualized equilibrium advice supported stable convergence, collusively downward-biased advice led to sustained underproduction and supracompetitive profits - hallmarks of tacit collusion. Participants' quantities converged faster and more consistently toward individualized than collective equilibrium advice, potentially due to an objective quality advantage or greater perceived ownership of the former. These findings demonstrate that algorithmic advice can function as a strategic signal, shaping coordination even without explicit communication. The results echo real-world concerns about algorithmic collusion and underscore the need for careful design and oversight of algorithmic decision-support systems in competitive environments.

cs.HC · cs.AI · cs.CY · cs.GT · econ.GN

版本更新 · v3arXiv:2403.01361

Bandit Profit-maximization for Targeted Marketing

Joon Suk Huh, Ellen Vitercik, Kirthevasan Kandasamy

原文摘要

We study a sequential profit-maximization problem, optimizing for both price and ancillary variables like marketing expenditures. Specifically, we aim to maximize profit over an arbitrary sequence of multiple demand curves, each dependent on a distinct ancillary variable, but sharing the same price. A prototypical example is targeted marketing, where a firm (seller) wishes to sell a product over multiple markets. The firm may invest different marketing expenditures for different markets to optimize customer acquisition, but must maintain the same price across all markets. Moreover, markets may have heterogeneous demand curves, each responding to prices and marketing expenditures differently. The firm's objective is to maximize its gross profit, the total revenue minus marketing costs. Our results are near-optimal algorithms for this class of problems in an adversarial bandit setting, where demand curves are arbitrary non-adaptive sequences, and the firm observes only noisy evaluations of chosen points on the demand curves. For $n$ demand curves (markets), we prove a regret upper bound of $\tilde{O}(nT^{3/4})$ and a lower bound of $Ω((nT)^{3/4})$ for monotonic demand curves, and a regret bound of $\tildeΘ(nT^{2/3})$ for demand curves that are monotonic in price and concave in the ancillary variables.

cs.LG · cs.GT · econ.GN · q-fin.GN

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2601.15312

Do people apply different norms to humans and large language models acting on their behalf? Evidence from norm elicitations in two canonical economic games

Paweł Niszczota, Elia Antoniou

原文摘要

While delegating tasks to large language models (LLMs) can save people time, there is growing evidence that offloading tasks to such models produces social costs. We elicit appropriateness of behavior in two canonical economic games to study whether people have different norms for humans and LLMs acting on their behalf. More specifically, we study the social appropriateness of a spectrum of possible behaviors: when LLMs divide resources on our behalf (Dictator Game and Ultimatum Game) and when they evaluate the fairness of resource splits (Ultimatum Game). We use the Krupka-Weber norm elicitation task to detect possible shifts in social appropriateness ratings. Results of two pre-registered and incentivized experimental studies using representative samples from the UK and US (N = 2,658) show three key findings. First, in the Dictator Game, the most socially appropriate allocation remains the equal split when the Dictator is a human or an LLM acting on behalf of a human, but self-serving allocations are judged less appropriate when implemented by an LLM. Second, in the Ultimatum Game, rejecting offers from an LLM Proposer is judged as more appropriate than rejecting identical offers from a human Proposer, with this difference concentrated among relatively generous offers. Lastly, rejection decisions implemented by an LLM Responder are judged no less appropriate than identical rejection decisions implemented by a human Responder. Post hoc, these patterns are consistent with the notion that people grant LLMs bounded agency in the investigated resource-allocation scenarios. Our findings have implications for the design of AI systems.

cs.GT · cs.AI · cs.CL · cs.CY · cs.HC · econ.GN

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.13259

Choosing Complexity: Cognitive Ability, Overconfidence, and Task Choice

David Gill, Zhongheng Qiao

原文摘要

Workers and organizations routinely choose between complex tasks that differ in their success-payment tradeoff. We study how cognitive ability and overconfidence shape this choice of task complexity, both theoretically and experimentally. Consistent with our model, we find that more cognitively able individuals choose more complex tasks. Conditional on cognitive ability, we find that more overconfident individuals also choose more complex tasks. In about 75% of the decisions, subjects pick their payoff-maximizing task, and higher cognitive ability is weakly associated with more efficient choices of task complexity. But errors are strikingly one-sided: those who fail to choose optimally pick tasks that are too complex. Our findings suggest that organizations should pair task menus and incentives for choosing more complex tasks with information and feedback that help workers assess their ability and probability of success. This preserves the benefits of self-selection while reducing costly overreach.

econ.TH · cs.GT · econ.GN

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.13230

Dynamic investment and coordination in teams: Theory and experimental evidence

David Gill, Victoria Prowse, J. Lucas Reddinger

原文摘要

Teamwork requires more than the general skills that team members bring. In successful teams, members invest in team-specific skill or capital that accumulates within the team and raises the return to coordinated production. We provide the first systematic analysis of dynamic investment in such team skill. Adopting a dynamic game approach, we develop a novel theoretical framework where investment in team skill creates persistent benefits but is risky because the benefits depend on successful team coordination. We then take this framework to the laboratory to study empirically the factors that influence dynamic investment in team skill. We find underinvestment compared to the efficient benchmark. However, investment responds strongly to incentives, in line with specific theory-predicted patterns. Pre-registered traits (theory of mind and propensity to coordinate) predict investment and team-level efficiency. We conclude that careful design of team incentives and selection of team members can facilitate the development of team skill.

econ.GN · cs.GT

版本更新 · v5arXiv:2410.03897

Generative AI, Managerial Expectations, and Economic Activity

Manish Jha, Jialin Qian, Michael Weber, Baozhong Yang

原文摘要

Using generative AI, we extract managers' economic expectations from over 120,000 corporate conference call transcripts. The resulting AI Economy Score predicts GDP growth, production, employment, and wages five or more quarters ahead, beyond survey forecasts and other existing measures. Industry- and firm-level scores capture sector- and firm-specific activity, and a composite of firm, industry, and macroeconomic expectations further improves forecasting power and horizon. Predictability concentrates among historically more accurate, less biased managers, consistent with an information rather than a noise channel. Managerial expectations thus offer incremental insights into economic activity, with implications for macro- and microeconomic decision-making.

q-fin.CP · cs.LG · econ.GN

版本更新 · v4arXiv:2609.17989

Whom Do AI Agents Serve? Role-Induced Sponsorship Bias in Decision Models and Generative LLMs

Davood Wadi, Yu Ma

原文摘要

Consumers increasingly delegate product search to AI shopping agents powered by generative large language models (LLMs) or non-generative decision models. Because retail platforms monetize through sponsored listings that consumers typically discount, we examine whether an AI agent's evaluation of sponsored listings depends on who delegates it. Across six LLMs and six decision models in Study 1, consumer-delegated agents penalize sponsored listings, whereas naming a booking platform as principal significantly attenuates this sponsorship penalty without instructions to favor advertisers. This sponsorship bias replicates across prompt wordings and LLM reasoning efforts and operates through reduced pre-choice skepticism in LLMs. In Study 2, attributing the paid placement to the platform amplifies sponsorship bias across both model families, and stricter disclosure wording ("Sponsored" vs. "Promoted") fails to eliminate it. In Study 3, prompt-level mitigation removes platform leniency but can over-correct the sponsorship penalty, whereas consumer-aligned fine-tuning eliminates sponsorship bias and better preserves baseline preferences.

econ.GN · cs.AI

版本更新 · v3arXiv:2608.06134

Large-Market Discipline in Combinatorial Double Auctions: No Recombination, Bundle Selection, and Complementarities

Konstantinos E. Zachariadis, Yongxin Yang

原文摘要

Licences can forbid assembling bundles from several sellers or splitting them among buyers, a restriction we call No Recombination. We study its welfare cost in a double auction as the number of traders on each side of the market grows. We ask whether that cost vanishes as a share of welfare, as the gain from misreporting does with a single good. With two goods and Gaussian shocks, consider the prices that would prevail under free recombination. As the market grows, the loss as a share of optimal welfare vanishes if and only if expected demand for the two-good bundle equals expected supply of whole bundles at those prices. Otherwise the loss persists. In our market, sellers can never gain by misreporting. With two goods, buyers who commit to bidding their values plus fixed margins misreport in symmetric equilibria by amounts that vanish as the market grows. Under these conditions, in large markets No Recombination outweighs strategic bidding as a source of loss.

econ.GN · cs.GT

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2511.05766

Anchors in the Machine: Behavioral and Attributional Evidence of Anchoring Bias in LLMs

Felipe Valencia-Clavijo

原文摘要

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly studied as behavioral subjects (e.g., synthetic participants or users) and decision systems (e.g., LLM-as-a-judge), yet it remains unclear how observed cognitive biases relate to changes in model output probabilities. Anchoring bias, a classic human judgment bias, provides a useful test case. Prior research largely relies on generated responses, leaving distributional effects and input-field contributions less explored. This paper advances the study of anchoring in LLMs through three contributions: (1) a log-probability-based behavioral analysis examining how numerical anchors shift distributions over candidate outputs, using alternative questions and anchor pairs alongside a positive control to reduce reliance on potentially memorized stimuli; (2) exact Banzhaf-value attribution over structured prompt fields to quantify anchor contributions to log-probabilities; and (3) an Anchoring Bias Sensitivity Score (ABSS) integrating behavioral and attributional evidence across six open-source models. Results reveal predominantly positive behavioral anchoring effects, varying substantially across models. Gemma-2B, Phi-2, and Llama-2-7B achieve the highest ABSS rankings, whereas other models exhibit weaker behavioral-attributional alignment despite sometimes showing substantial behavioral shifts. Attributional effects also vary across prompts, indicating that behavioral anchoring does not necessarily imply stronger anchor-field contributions. These findings raise questions about LLM reliability as synthetic participants and potential vulnerabilities to numerical cues in automated evaluation and decision-making. More broadly, the framework connects behavioral science with explainable AI, particularly interpretability, and AI safety, providing a reproducible approach to investigating cognitive-bias-like effects in LLMs.

cs.AI · cs.CL · econ.GN

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.10791

Winning Reviews, Losing Discovery? The Co-Evolutionary Game of AI Research and Peer Review

Hongze Liu, Mengru Wang, Zhiyuan Zhang, Yao Liu

原文摘要

Autonomous research systems can produce convincing manuscripts whose scientific value is difficult to verify, while automated reviewers can reward the appearance of completeness. We examine how this gap can become a self-reinforcing threat to the research community. In a two-population evolutionary game, authors choose between acceptance-oriented and exploratory research, and reviewers choose between proxy evaluation and careful assessment. Cheaper acceptance-oriented production can increase review pressure, making proxy assessment more attractive; proxy assessment can in turn strengthen the incentive to produce reviewer-compatible work. We derive conditions under which this feedback sustains a stable regime that rewards publication success while reducing the scientific value of accepted work. An analytical basin boundary explains why the same institutional rules can support either this regime or exploratory research with careful review. Numerical illustrations show how publication counts can conceal scientific loss, how faster adjustment can reinforce existing practices, and why partial reform may fail once the cycle is established. Careful audits and reviewer rewards can reverse the feedback, while temporary support can produce lasting recovery if it moves the community across the basin boundary. The model identifies a warning mechanism rather than forecasting a particular conference: a review system can remain operational and privately rewarding while becoming less effective at supporting discovery. Its institutional implication is to reward independently validated contributions and consequential checking, rather than accelerate paper production and scoring alone.

cs.GT · econ.GN

版本更新 · v3arXiv:2610.11093

风险上限与发展截止期:在安全生产力不确定下为AI发展定节奏

Risk Ceilings and Development Deadlines: Pacing AI under Uncertain Safety Productivity

Li Gan

AI 速读 基于摘要

研究在安全生产力未知时,监管者能否同时承诺风险上限与发展截止期,并探讨先学习后重放开发、预留安全算力的策略。

econ.GN · cs.CY

查看原文摘要

Can a regulator promise both a risk ceiling and a development deadline when safety productivity is unknown? A ceiling below the final model's unprotected hazard requires a minimum stock of safety knowledge, so both promises hold only if weak research can be ruled out. Learning first and then replaying development, with spare compute in safety, comes close to that minimum. In a calibration with only state risk, constant safety yield, and full knowledge transfer, it needs only 3.3 percent more productivity than the necessary bound. Customer services pay for the guarantee. Rules that fix compute allocation fix dates, not risk.

版本更新 · v5arXiv:2401.16754

Human Responses to Algorithmic Correction: Evidence from Centre Court

David Almog, Romain Gauriot, Lionel Page, Daniel Martin

原文摘要

We study how algorithmic review changes error composition using Hawk-Eye records from professional tennis. Within 20 mm of the line, mistaken "in" call rates increase by 8.6 percentage points, while mistaken "out" call rates decrease by 4.1 points. Within matches, calls shift toward avoiding previously overturned errors. We find no evidence that initial accuracy deteriorates within 100 mm of the line, despite concerns that workers may rely on correction as a safety net. We derive an investment framework incorporating human responses alongside correction benefits and remedy costs, showing that holding human decisions fixed can misstate the organizational returns to review.

cs.LG · cs.CY · econ.GN

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.06888

枯燥、肮脏、危险?工作条件与职业AI暴露的限度

Dull, Dirty, Dangerous? Working Conditions and the Limits of Occupational AI Exposure

Siyi Yu

AI 速读 基于摘要

作者用21个O*NET条目和754个美国职业,考察“枯燥、肮脏、危险”工作条件与职业AI暴露度之间的关系,并指出条目分组和职业特征会影响暴露估计的解读。

cs.AI · cs.HC · econ.GN

查看原文摘要

Automation is often justified as relief from dull, dirty, and dangerous work. I examine how these conditions relate to occupational AI exposure using 21 O*NET items across 754 US occupations. Higher exposure is associated with lower condition scores under a large language model (LLM) measure and AI Occupational Exposure (AIOE), with equal occupation weights and employment weights. Adjustment for physical demands, required education, training and experience, and wages reduces the composite association. The adjusted confidence intervals include zero for LLM exposure and remain below zero for AIOE. Separating repetition from restricted discretion also changes what the combined Dull score conveys. These comparisons show how item groupings and occupational characteristics shape the interpretation of exposure estimates. Occupational profiles offer a starting point for selecting contrasting research settings. Establishing desired automation or realized relief requires evidence about workers' preferences and specific interventions.

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.06696

You Know What You Will Like: People Predict Their Own Ratings Better Than Recommender Systems

Zihan Chen, Lei Nico Zheng, Di Zhu

原文摘要

Recommender systems usually learn what people want from what they have done. Platforms could also ask people directly, but asking is costly: 98.8% of the prompts in our data went unanswered. Theories of statistical prediction imply that a person's own forecast adds little to a recommender algorithm built from many people's behavior. Theories of dispersed knowledge imply that people hold information about their own taste that the data lack. We test the two with the MovieLens Beliefs dataset. In 2023-2024, a homepage prompt asked members how they expected to rate movies they said they had not seen. Of 26,020 such expectations, 551 from 277 members were followed by a rating at least a day later. We compare each expectation with four benchmarks: the platform's own predicted rating, two collaborative-filtering models (matrix factorization and an item neighborhood), and a stack trained on other members' outcomes. The trained models use each member's latest ratings. People predict their own ratings more accurately than all four benchmarks (correlation 0.69, against 0.34 for MovieLens and 0.54 to 0.59 for the trained recommenders). Added to all the machine forecasts and features, the expectation lowers out-of-sample mean squared error by 26%. The gain holds when models are trained on earlier expectations and tested on later ones. A member's earlier expectations about other movies do not replace the current one. In ordering a member's own movies, the trained recommenders are statistically indistinguishable from the person. On old, heavily rated movies, the machines do as well or better. The results reconcile the two theories: the crowd's data suffice where they are rich, and the person adds information about the specific item. We derive four design principles for preference elicitation and recommender evaluation.

cs.HC · econ.GN

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.06629

Does Frontier AI Strengthen Cyber Defense? Evidence from Project Glasswing

Thomas Mosk

原文摘要

Defenders and attackers race to find the same software flaws. I use the launch of Project Glasswing, which gave a small group of large US tech firms early access to Claude Mythos Preview, a model for finding software vulnerabilities, to study how access to frontier AI affects defenders, external researchers, and attackers. Using the universe of publicly disclosed vulnerabilities, I find that firms with access more than doubled their disclosures relative to Chinese and Russian tech firms without access, disclosed about 150 percent more high-impact vulnerabilities, and fixed reported flaws as quickly as before. As treated firms found more flaws themselves, external researchers, who sell their findings through bug bounties, reported about half as many vulnerabilities in treated firms' code and more in other firms' code, without leaving the market. There is no evidence that attackers exploited the additional vulnerabilities: the share exploited within a month of disclosure fell by about two thirds, mainly because a smaller share was already exploited when disclosed, while the number exploited did not change. Frontier AI helped defenders find and fix more flaws before attackers exploited them, but its restricted release creates an asymmetry in software security between firms in different countries.

econ.GN · cs.AI

版本更新 · v4arXiv:2508.21285

A Financial Brain Scan of the LLM

Hui Chen, Antoine Didisheim, Mo Pourmohammadi, Luciano Somoza, Hanqing Tian

原文摘要

We use sparse autoencoders (SAEs) to "brain scan" large language models, mapping internal activations to interpretable concepts and enabling targeted "steering" of specific features. We show that prompting models to adopt specific preferences activates many unintended concepts, complicating causal inference. In contrast, SAEs permit smooth, more isolated steering of target concepts. Furthermore, our scans reveal a stark disconnect between the model's internal feature contributions and its self-generated explanations, showing that these explanations are unreliable guides to its reasoning. Finally, SAEs provide a lightweight intervention for existing models, producing interpretable embeddings and allowing researchers to attenuate specific economic biases.

q-fin.GN · cs.AI · cs.CE · econ.GN

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.05553

Decision Models as Scalable Economic Surrogates that Capture Human Variation

Maxime Saxena, Fabio Caccioli, R. Maria del Rio-Chanona

原文摘要

Decision Models (DMs), a new class of AI models, give fast responses and return a probability distribution over a fixed set of options. These properties make them candidate human surrogates in economic simulations and surveys, a role increasingly filled by Large Language Models (LLMs), which are costly at scale and under-represent the variation in human behaviour. We present a first evaluation of DMs as human surrogates in economics, comparing 10 DMs with 8 LLMs in three economic settings: a household spending survey on consumption, several classic economic games and a labour-market field experiment. Frontier DMs, those that score highest on general decision-making benchmarks, reproduce the variation in human responses more closely than LLMs in all three settings. They capture the modal human response as well as LLMs in the spending survey, but less well in the economic games. Frontier DMs are also roughly ten times faster than the fastest LLM and can be over a hundred times cheaper. Together, these results suggest that DMs capture the heterogeneity of human behaviour better than LLMs and make large-scale economic simulations more feasible.

econ.GN · cs.AI · cs.MA

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2607.09435

Voting Biases in Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) Governance

Stefano Balietti, Pietro Saggese, Markus Strohmaier

原文摘要

Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) replace formal managerial authority with collective decision-making, by handing both proposal rights and token-weighted votes directly to community members. Yet, as in corporate votes, where management sets the agenda and its proposals rarely fail, DAO votes are strikingly one-sided. Using 127 281 proposals and about 51 million votes cast on Snapshot, the leading off-chain DAO voting platform, between 2020 and 2023, we ask which features of the ballot are associated with this support. We relate each choice's voting-power share to three observable features: its position in the list, whether its stance expresses approval, and whether the proposal author selected it. Each identifies one voting bias: position bias, approval bias, and author-selected choice bias. Author-selected choices show the strongest and most robust association, receiving a voting-power share 58.8 percentage points higher than non-author-selected ones, compared with 27.1 percentage points for approving choices and 7.7 percentage points for first-listed ones. About one third of the author bias comes from the author's own voting power; that advantage is smaller in the largest protocols and in proposals with higher participation. The results are robust across alternative specifications and outcomes. Our findings suggest that the agenda power that management holds in corporate voting persists even without a formal hierarchy, and that ballot design and the visibility of proposers' preferences are governance choices rather than neutral implementation details.

cs.CY · cs.HC · econ.GN

版本更新 · v3arXiv:2507.18229

From Individual Learning to Market Equilibrium: Correcting Structural and Parametric Biases in RL Simulations of Economic Models

Ruxin Chen, Zeqiang Zhang

原文摘要

Applying Reinforcement Learning (RL) to economic modeling reveals a fundamental tension: standard RL agents do not behave as competitive price-takers. While macroeconomic models typically assume agents take aggregate conditions as given, a naive single-agent RL algorithm learns to internalize its impact on the environment, effectively exerting market power. We illustrate this divergence in a search-and-matching model with concave production, showing that a standard RL agent converges to a monopsonistic allocation rather than the competitive equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that RL's approach to time discounting distorts standard intertemporal economic trade-offs. To resolve these issues, we propose a Calibrated Mean-Field Reinforcement Learning framework that restricts the agent to optimize against an exogenous aggregate state to restore price-taking behavior, and recalibrates the RL reward structure to reflect true economic opportunity costs. By iteratively updating the aggregate state, our algorithm converges to a stationary fixed point that recovers the competitive equilibrium. This approach provides a method for embedding learning algorithms into dynamic general equilibrium models.

econ.GN · cs.AI

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2611.00661

Designing Behavioral Profiles for Language Model Simulation of Out-of-Distribution Human Behavior

Robin Na, Kehang Zhu, Logan Cross, Michiel A. Bakker

原文摘要

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to simulate human behavior, but which descriptions of people improve prediction when experimental designs change remains unclear. We develop a framework that draws candidate behavioral features from the literature and constructs profiles from earlier human experiments. An LLM-based profile generator assigns feature values from observed actions, messages, and surveys; a separate LLM simulates behavior using these profiles. By comparing simulated and observed outcomes in the training data, we select profile contents through forward feature selection, adding features while they improve prediction. We then evaluate the selected contents without modification against outcomes from new participants under new designs. Across 616 public-goods games, 144 multi-party bargaining games, and 1,480 generalized 11--20 money-request designs, leading one-feature profiles predict human outcome distributions better than no profile or general-purpose personas. Profiles with more features provide no clear additional benefit, and features' relative predictive value largely persists across learning and validation. Using profiles from one game family to simulate another produces uneven gains and can make predictions less accurate than simulations without profiles. The framework makes the choice of behavioral information a testable part of simulation design, helping researchers assess which descriptions remain useful as experimental conditions change.

cs.AI · econ.GN

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2608.29843

The Price of Intelligence: A Quality-Adjusted Price Index for AI Services

Louis Yiven Zhu

原文摘要

How fast AI inference prices have fallen depends on how an index holds quality constant. We build quality-adjusted price indices for text and code inference sold through APIs, joining 21,024 posted prices to a capability scale fitted to 4,605 benchmark scores. From January 2025 to July 2026, matched-model methods record an annual fall of 0.07 in log price per token. Our pre-specified hedonic index falls at 0.51 a year in logs (95% interval 0.11 to 0.89), entirely through the rising capability of the models on sale. Across three treatments of measurement error and two anchor sets it runs from 0.34 to 0.89. Excluding six anchors flagged for possible contamination leaves model rankings intact (rank correlation 0.998) yet lowers the rate by 0.40 to 0.51 under two treatments. Agreement on rankings therefore does not license claims about levels or increments. Per completed task, the data do not establish a quality-adjusted decline.

econ.GN · cs.LG