Umar Ahmed, Maxim Dunaev, Mohammad Nour Al Awad, Sergey Ivanov, Ivan Khodnenko
原文摘要
A small language model that turns a typed order into structure can fail in two ways. It can print something broken, which any system rejects. Or it can print a clean, well formed order that nobody placed. Our companion work calls the second kind a silent error, and it is the dangerous one. We present a web demo in which a fine-tuned 0.8B parameter model runs entirely inside the visitor's browser tab, through llama.cpp compiled to WebAssembly. No order text leaves the device. The page parses orders as the visitor types, scores every ticket with the PIZZA benchmark's own matcher ported to TypeScript, refuses anything off the menu with "?" so the model can face the open web, and lets visitors hunt for silent errors or try to cause one. Run in the browser on all 1,357 PIZZA test orders, the deployed model writes the same output as the server evaluation for 99.0% of them and reaches the same exact match (0.882); we also report its latency on 3 consumer laptops. Demo: https://wrong.cuyor.com
A small fine-tuned parser that emits a well-formed but wrong tree fails silently: nothing downstream can tell. We ask whether the output format, a free design choice, controls how often this happens. On the PIZZA ordering benchmark we fine-tune two sub-billion models (Qwen3.5-0.8B and LFM2.5-350M) with LoRA on six lossless encodings of the same target tree, from 44.3 down to 10.9 tokens per order, including two matched-length pairs that vary surface form at fixed length. Across 300 runs (5 training pool sizes, 5 seeds) with a hierarchical bootstrap and Holm correction fixed before the results were read, shortening alone never helps, but writing the target in ordinary words does. The word encoding is the most accurate format on both models (87.5% vs. 85.8% exact match for the native s-expression on Qwen) while emitting 4.1x fewer tokens, and it cuts the silent error rate by 2.3x on Qwen and 1.8x on LFM2, separating at every pool size. Error analysis locates much of the gain in negation. All runs also learn to refuse off-menu input (held out: 95.9-99.0% handled) and to apply in-utterance self-corrections. Strict refusal has a measured price: 2.1-10.1% of real, mostly polite, orders are refused.