Network-Exposed Configuration Attacks on LLM-Controlled Social Robots
Stanley Akingbola, Ugbede Ibrahim, Yan Lin Aung, Quang Dan Le, Hong Qing Yu
原文摘要
Large language models (LLMs) in embodied robots create security dependencies beyond inference. We investigate a network-exposed configuration attack on the Pollen Robotics Reachy Mini Lite, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to replace personality settings and the cloud LLM's system prompt through a management interface, without adversarial conversational input. Eleven prompt-injection attempts across five categories were reported as resisted, whereas both configuration-layer attack paths produced observable behavioural changes on physical hardware. We demonstrate local and network-adjacent access, mapping the weakness to CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for a Critical Function) and CWE-1327 (Binding to an Unrestricted IP Address), with a reported CVSS v3.1 score of 6.5 (Medium). A configuration endpoint also accepts cross-origin requests without a CORS preflight (CWE-352; 6.5 Medium), while the persistent-memory sink stores content without enforcing its stated restrictions. A source review of 59 public repositories identifies missing authentication in 10 of 11 source-verifiable genuine applications, or 11 of 11 including a framework-default case. These findings indicate recurrence within the sampled repositories, not prevalence in commercial products. We characterise a deployment gap between developer-oriented network assumptions and consumer-facing embodied AI security: inference-layer refusal cannot prevent unauthorised changes to model instructions. Potential consequences include surveillance through onboard cameras and microphones and social engineering of nearby users. Proof-of-concept code, evidence and the survey are available at https://bit.ly/reachypi.
cs.CR · cs.AI · cs.RO