← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2407.01176 · v2
Platform Building with Fake Users: On Airdrop Farmers and Activity Procurement
首次提交 2024-07-01 18:59
版本更新 2026-11-11 07:35
雷达观测 2026-11-13 11:12
摘要
Digital platforms reward observable claims to build their user base. Because claims are imperfect proxies for people, these programs attract bonus hunters and airdrop farmers, who are usually treated as leakage and screened out. We show that screening can be too aggressive when eligibility requires a separable platform-building input. In a monopolist model, fixed per-claim rewards cannot implement finite farmer activity: rewards below farmer cost induce no entry, while rewards above cost induce unbounded entry. A shared pool can succeed because it makes claims rivalrous. Entry dilutes the pool until the per-claim reward equals claim cost, converting the program into identity-blind procurement. In the baseline model, all farmer-created claims have the same lower cost, while all organic claims have the same higher cost; farmers therefore supply the activity. Organic users receive no rewards but benefit from higher quality, so perfect screening can reduce platform profit and organic-user payoffs. In case when primary organic claims are cheaper but additional organic identities cost more than farmer claims, a small pool attracts only organic claims, whereas a larger pool recruits farmers to expand activity. The mechanism applies to separable inputs (e.g., liquidity, inventory, and data) rather than rewards for regular use or mechanical claim creation. Thus, weak identity changes both leakage and how platforms procure growth.
作者备注：46 pages, 1 figure
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v2 · 2026-11-11 07:35 · 最新观测版本
Platform Building with Fake Users: On Airdrop Farmers and Activity Procurement
Digital platforms reward observable claims to build their user base. Because claims are imperfect proxies for people, these programs attract bonus hunters and airdrop farmers, who are usually treated as leakage and screened out. We show that screening can be too aggressive when eligibility requires a separable platform-building input. In a monopolist model, fixed per-claim rewards cannot implement finite farmer activity: rewards below farmer cost induce no entry, while rewards above cost induce unbounded entry. A shared pool can succeed because it makes claims rivalrous. Entry dilutes the pool until the per-claim reward equals claim cost, converting the program into identity-blind procurement. In the baseline model, all farmer-created claims have the same lower cost, while all organic claims have the same higher cost; farmers therefore supply the activity. Organic users receive no rewards but benefit from higher quality, so perfect screening can reduce platform profit and organic-user payoffs. In case when primary organic claims are cheaper but additional organic identities cost more than farmer claims, a small pool attracts only organic claims, whereas a larger pool recruits farmers to expand activity. The mechanism applies to separable inputs (e.g., liquidity, inventory, and data) rather than rewards for regular use or mechanical claim creation. Thus, weak identity changes both leakage and how platforms procure growth.
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