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arXiv:2506.18814 · v3

Online Learning in Stabilized Linear Dynamical Games with Adversarial Disturbances

首次提交 2025-06-24 00:24
版本更新 2026-10-26 01:48
雷达观测 2026-10-29 00:36
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摘要

We study online learning in linear dynamical games where multiple strategic agents act on a shared state evolving according to a linear dynamical system subject to adversarial disturbances. This setting lies beyond both single-agent nonstochastic online control and classical linear-quadratic games, which typically focus on quadratic objectives and noiseless or stochastic dynamics. Each agent seeks to minimize its own sequence of convex losses under full-state observability. Following the stabilizing-baseline paradigm in nonstochastic online control, we assume access to linear controllers that stabilize the noiseless system and focus on online adaptation by learning disturbance-action corrections. This extends adversarial online control to strategic multi-agent shared-state systems, where each agent's actions shape the state trajectory and hence the realized losses of all learners. Under state-only and aggregate-input feedback models, we analyze agents running online gradient descent with memory to update their own disturbance-action policies. We prove per-agent regret bounds that are sublinear and near-optimal in the time horizon, with population dependence that varies under the specified feedback, opponent policy, and stability assumptions. In the common-interest case, where all agents have identical cost functions, we show that the induced online problem forms a time-varying potential game and derive equilibrium tracking guarantees. Together, our results provide a theoretical framework for adversarial online learning in stabilized linear dynamical games, connecting online control with learning in games.

作者备注:NeurIPS 2026

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v3 · 2026-10-26 01:48 · 最新观测版本

Online Learning in Stabilized Linear Dynamical Games with Adversarial Disturbances

We study online learning in linear dynamical games where multiple strategic agents act on a shared state evolving according to a linear dynamical system subject to adversarial disturbances. This setting lies beyond both single-agent nonstochastic online control and classical linear-quadratic games, which typically focus on quadratic objectives and noiseless or stochastic dynamics. Each agent seeks to minimize its own sequence of convex losses under full-state observability. Following the stabilizing-baseline paradigm in nonstochastic online control, we assume access to linear controllers that stabilize the noiseless system and focus on online adaptation by learning disturbance-action corrections. This extends adversarial online control to strategic multi-agent shared-state systems, where each agent's actions shape the state trajectory and hence the realized losses of all learners. Under state-only and aggregate-input feedback models, we analyze agents running online gradient descent with memory to update their own disturbance-action policies. We prove per-agent regret bounds that are sublinear and near-optimal in the time horizon, with population dependence that varies under the specified feedback, opponent policy, and stability assumptions. In the common-interest case, where all agents have identical cost functions, we show that the induced online problem forms a time-varying potential game and derive equilibrium tracking guarantees. Together, our results provide a theoretical framework for adversarial online learning in stabilized linear dynamical games, connecting online control with learning in games.

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