← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2510.13992 · v2
Optimizing Spectral Signature in Code Backdoor Detection
首次提交 2025-10-16 02:18
版本更新 2026-10-28 01:45
雷达观测 2026-10-29 00:34
摘要
As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into software development workflows, they also become prime targets for adversarial attacks. Among these, backdoor attacks are a significant threat, allowing attackers to manipulate model outputs through hidden triggers embedded in training data. Detecting such backdoors remains a challenge, and one promising approach is the use of Spectral Signature defense methods that identify poisoned data by analyzing feature representations through eigenvectors. While some prior works have explored Spectral Signatures for backdoor detection in neural networks, recent studies suggest that these methods may not be optimally effective for code models. In this paper, we revisit the applicability of Spectral Signature-based defenses in the context of backdoor attacks on code models. We systematically evaluate their effectiveness under various attack scenarios and defense configurations, analyzing their strengths and limitations. We found that the widely used setting of Spectral Signature in code backdoor detection is often suboptimal. Hence, we explored the impact of different settings of the key factors. We discovered a new proxy metric that can more accurately estimate the actual performance of Spectral Signature without model retraining after the defense. Our findings contribute to a deeper understanding of the configurations of Spectral Signature defenses in securing code models and offer insights into potential improvements for future research.
作者备注：Accepted at the IEEE International Conference on Software Maintenance and Evolution (ICSME 2026). 12 pages, 4 figures
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v2 · 2026-10-28 01:45 · 最新观测版本
Optimizing Spectral Signature in Code Backdoor Detection
As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into software development workflows, they also become prime targets for adversarial attacks. Among these, backdoor attacks are a significant threat, allowing attackers to manipulate model outputs through hidden triggers embedded in training data. Detecting such backdoors remains a challenge, and one promising approach is the use of Spectral Signature defense methods that identify poisoned data by analyzing feature representations through eigenvectors. While some prior works have explored Spectral Signatures for backdoor detection in neural networks, recent studies suggest that these methods may not be optimally effective for code models. In this paper, we revisit the applicability of Spectral Signature-based defenses in the context of backdoor attacks on code models. We systematically evaluate their effectiveness under various attack scenarios and defense configurations, analyzing their strengths and limitations. We found that the widely used setting of Spectral Signature in code backdoor detection is often suboptimal. Hence, we explored the impact of different settings of the key factors. We discovered a new proxy metric that can more accurately estimate the actual performance of Spectral Signature without model retraining after the defense. Our findings contribute to a deeper understanding of the configurations of Spectral Signature defenses in securing code models and offer insights into potential improvements for future research.
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