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arXiv:2601.22978 · v4

Triosecuris: Formally Verified Protection Against Speculative Control-Flow Hijacking

首次提交 2026-01-30 21:42
版本更新 2026-11-19 21:26
雷达观测 2026-11-20 16:53
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摘要

This paper introduces Triosecuris, a formally verified defense against Spectre BTB, RSB, and PHT that combines CET-style hardware-assisted control-flow integrity with compiler-inserted speculative load hardening (SLH). Triosecuris is based on the novel observation that in the presence of CET-style protection, we can precisely detect BTB misspeculation for indirect calls and RSB misspeculation for returns and set the SLH misspeculation flag. We formalize Triosecuris as a transformation in Rocq and provide a machine-checked proof that it achieves relative security: any transformed program running with speculation leaks no more than what the source program leaks without speculation. This strong security guarantee applies to arbitrary programs, even those not following the cryptographic constant-time programming discipline.

作者备注:Appeared at CSF'26; extended version with appendices and a bit more related work. W.r.t. first arXiv version: extended with concrete protection against Spectre RSB and renamed to Triosecuris

期刊信息:39th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) (2026) 544-559

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v4 · 2026-11-19 21:26 · 最新观测版本

Triosecuris: Formally Verified Protection Against Speculative Control-Flow Hijacking

This paper introduces Triosecuris, a formally verified defense against Spectre BTB, RSB, and PHT that combines CET-style hardware-assisted control-flow integrity with compiler-inserted speculative load hardening (SLH). Triosecuris is based on the novel observation that in the presence of CET-style protection, we can precisely detect BTB misspeculation for indirect calls and RSB misspeculation for returns and set the SLH misspeculation flag. We formalize Triosecuris as a transformation in Rocq and provide a machine-checked proof that it achieves relative security: any transformed program running with speculation leaks no more than what the source program leaks without speculation. This strong security guarantee applies to arbitrary programs, even those not following the cryptographic constant-time programming discipline.

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