arXiv:2602.04007 · v2

Boost+: Equitable, Incentive-Compatible Block Building

首次提交 2026-02-04 04:51

版本更新 2026-11-01 12:41

雷达观测 2026-11-04 23:43

摘要

Block space on the blockchain is scarce and must be allocated efficiently through block building. However, Ethereum's current block-building ecosystem, MEV-Boost, has become highly centralized due to integration, which distorts competition, reduces blockspace efficiency, and obscures MEV flow transparency. To improve equitability and economic efficiency in block building, we propose $\textsf{Boost+}$, a system that pools submitted order flows inside an attested execution environment and gives all participating block-building algorithms equal access to them. The core of $\textsf{Boost+}$ is the mechanism $M_{\textsf{Boost+}}$, built around a baseline block-building algorithm. $M_{\textsf{Boost+}}$ aligns incentives for both searchers (intermediaries that generate or route transactions) and builders: Truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for all builders. For searchers, truthful reporting is dominant whenever the baseline algorithm dominates competing builders, and it remains dominant for all conflict-free transactions, even when builders may win. We further show that even if a searcher can technically integrate with a builder, non-integration combined with truthful bidding still dominates any deviation for conflict-free transactions. We also implement a concrete baseline algorithm informed by empirical analysis of real-world transactions and evaluate its efficacy using historical data.

作者备注：Published in NDSS 2027