跳到正文
研踪PaperTrail
← 研踪 PaperTrail

arXiv:2602.08693 · v2

Reasoning under uncertainty in humans and language models

首次提交 2026-02-09 22:13
版本更新 2026-11-16 19:40
雷达观测 2026-11-17 17:11
arXiv ↗PDF ↗

摘要

Do language models make decisions under uncertainty like humans do? And if so, what role does extended reasoning play in the underlying decision process? We answer this question by introducing an active probabilistic reasoning task that cleanly separates sampling (actively acquiring evidence) from inference (integrating evidence towards a decision). Benchmarking humans and a broad set of contemporary LLMs against an optimal reference policy reveals a consistent pattern: extended reasoning is the key determinant of strong performance, driving large gains in inference, while yielding only modest improvements in active sampling. To explain these differences, we fit a behavioral model that captures systematic deviations from optimal Bayesian behavior through interpretable parameter families, placing humans and models in a shared low-dimensional cognitive space. The resulting fits show how reasoning shifts models toward human-like regimes of evidence accumulation and belief-to-choice mapping, and yield testable predictions about the latent dynamics that might drive each decision. Probing residual-stream activations of an open-weight reasoning model, we find that the geometry of internal representations tracks these predicted dynamics, linking behavior to representational correlates of the fitted latent dynamics.

作者备注:Accepted at NeurIPS 2026. 49 pages, 5 main figures, additional figures in the appendix

AI 论文解读

基于摘要 · 非全文审阅

此版本尚未生成 AI 解读。解读由后台任务生成并按论文版本保存,登录后共享已有结果。

版本差异

本站首次收录为 v2,暂无更早版本可对照。

观测到的版本

相邻记录可能跳过中间版本;首次发现 v2 及以上也会标为版本更新。

v2 · 2026-11-16 19:40 · 最新观测版本

Reasoning under uncertainty in humans and language models

Do language models make decisions under uncertainty like humans do? And if so, what role does extended reasoning play in the underlying decision process? We answer this question by introducing an active probabilistic reasoning task that cleanly separates sampling (actively acquiring evidence) from inference (integrating evidence towards a decision). Benchmarking humans and a broad set of contemporary LLMs against an optimal reference policy reveals a consistent pattern: extended reasoning is the key determinant of strong performance, driving large gains in inference, while yielding only modest improvements in active sampling. To explain these differences, we fit a behavioral model that captures systematic deviations from optimal Bayesian behavior through interpretable parameter families, placing humans and models in a shared low-dimensional cognitive space. The resulting fits show how reasoning shifts models toward human-like regimes of evidence accumulation and belief-to-choice mapping, and yield testable predictions about the latent dynamics that might drive each decision. Probing residual-stream activations of an open-weight reasoning model, we find that the geometry of internal representations tracks these predicted dynamics, linking behavior to representational correlates of the fitted latent dynamics.

查看此版本解读 →查看此版本原文 ↗