← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2604.03387 · v2
What Bayesian Updating Presupposes: Hume's Representational Conditions and Causal Learning
首次提交 2026-04-04 02:36
版本更新 2026-11-01 14:38
雷达观测 2026-11-04 23:43
摘要
Bayesian causal models explain how expectations change, but they leave a further question open: how does the learner acquire the causal content whose probability changes? I argue that updating alone leaves three conditions of causal judgment unexplained: experiential grounding, general organization, and belief. Hume links these conditions through a felt customary transition, which arises from discriminating resembling cases and supplies the idea of necessary connexion. His arguments against deriving necessity directly from a single interaction or from an act of will support this account of the source. Contemporary causal-theory learning uses perceptual and agency cues to acquire an intervention role. The resulting disagreement is about what that role explains about experienced causal necessity, not about whether the model learns anything. Three elementary constructions distinguish acquisition from assisted execution, lost distinctions from failed access, and posterior agreement from usable deployment. Sampling theories and stable-belief accounts supply further components beyond updating. For models that learn about external events solely through a text corpus and written reports, the evidence is report-mediated rather than firsthand; whether their own transitions are felt is a separate, open question, and the update rule settles neither matter. The paper identifies what a complete explanation must connect: the acquisition of causal content, its availability for general use, and its role in belief. Correct posterior prediction alone establishes none of these connections.
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v2 · 2026-11-01 14:38 · 最新观测版本
What Bayesian Updating Presupposes: Hume's Representational Conditions and Causal Learning
Bayesian causal models explain how expectations change, but they leave a further question open: how does the learner acquire the causal content whose probability changes? I argue that updating alone leaves three conditions of causal judgment unexplained: experiential grounding, general organization, and belief. Hume links these conditions through a felt customary transition, which arises from discriminating resembling cases and supplies the idea of necessary connexion. His arguments against deriving necessity directly from a single interaction or from an act of will support this account of the source. Contemporary causal-theory learning uses perceptual and agency cues to acquire an intervention role. The resulting disagreement is about what that role explains about experienced causal necessity, not about whether the model learns anything. Three elementary constructions distinguish acquisition from assisted execution, lost distinctions from failed access, and posterior agreement from usable deployment. Sampling theories and stable-belief accounts supply further components beyond updating. For models that learn about external events solely through a text corpus and written reports, the evidence is report-mediated rather than firsthand; whether their own transitions are felt is a separate, open question, and the update rule settles neither matter. The paper identifies what a complete explanation must connect: the acquisition of causal content, its availability for general use, and its role in belief. Correct posterior prediction alone establishes none of these connections.
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