跳到正文
研踪PaperTrail
← 研踪 PaperTrail

arXiv:2605.17062 · v4

The Range Shrinks, the Threat Remains: Re-evaluating LLM Package Hallucinations on the 2026 Frontier-Model Cohort

首次提交 2026-05-17 00:08
版本更新 2026-11-10 01:07
雷达观测 2026-11-10 15:22
arXiv ↗PDF ↗

摘要

Package hallucinations, LLM-generated references to packages that do not exist, enable slopsquatting: an attacker registers the hallucinated name. We replicate Spracklen et al. (USENIX Security '25) on five 2026 frontier models over 199,840 Python and JavaScript generations. This version reports a preregistered live revalidation that replaces the static package lists of earlier versions with two independent checks against the live PyPI and npm registries. Hallucination rates are 3.6-5.0% of package mentions (2.2-3.4% of generations): the 2026 frontier sits at the level of 2024's commercial models, and the open-weight gap seen in 2024 has disappeared. Python exceeds JavaScript for every model. The set of names hallucinated by all five models shrinks from the 127 reported earlier to 104; 26 earlier entries were correct import statements whose module name differs from the package name. Using the accidental six-month public exposure of our own list as a natural experiment, we find no detectable effect of publication: about 1% of hallucinated names were registered within six months, at the same rate for published and unpublished names, and the 95% interval excludes increases above 2.5 percentage points. Still, at least 23 package names that the models suggest had previously hosted malware later removed by the registries, and one hallucinated name was registered with malware after our runs.

作者备注:18 pages, 3 figures. v4: preregistered live revalidation against PyPI and npm; numbers revised (Sec. 7); new analysis of registrations of hallucinated names (Sec. 8). Supersedes v1-v3 and the SCORED '26 version. Replicates Spracklen et al. (USENIX Security 2025). Code: https://github.com/churik5/slopsquatting-replication-2026 Artifact: https://github.com/churik5/slopsquatting-revalidation-2026

AI 论文解读

基于摘要 · 非全文审阅

此版本尚未生成 AI 解读。解读由后台任务生成并按论文版本保存,登录后共享已有结果。

版本差异

目前只观测到一个版本,无法比较变化。之后收录新版本时,会在这里对照标题、作者、分类和摘要。

观测到的版本

相邻记录可能跳过中间版本;首次发现 v2 及以上也会标为版本更新。

v4 · 2026-11-10 01:07 · 最新观测版本

The Range Shrinks, the Threat Remains: Re-evaluating LLM Package Hallucinations on the 2026 Frontier-Model Cohort

Package hallucinations, LLM-generated references to packages that do not exist, enable slopsquatting: an attacker registers the hallucinated name. We replicate Spracklen et al. (USENIX Security '25) on five 2026 frontier models over 199,840 Python and JavaScript generations. This version reports a preregistered live revalidation that replaces the static package lists of earlier versions with two independent checks against the live PyPI and npm registries. Hallucination rates are 3.6-5.0% of package mentions (2.2-3.4% of generations): the 2026 frontier sits at the level of 2024's commercial models, and the open-weight gap seen in 2024 has disappeared. Python exceeds JavaScript for every model. The set of names hallucinated by all five models shrinks from the 127 reported earlier to 104; 26 earlier entries were correct import statements whose module name differs from the package name. Using the accidental six-month public exposure of our own list as a natural experiment, we find no detectable effect of publication: about 1% of hallucinated names were registered within six months, at the same rate for published and unpublished names, and the 95% interval excludes increases above 2.5 percentage points. Still, at least 23 package names that the models suggest had previously hosted malware later removed by the registries, and one hallucinated name was registered with malware after our runs.

查看此版本解读 →查看此版本原文 ↗