← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2605.17510 · v2
Scale-Dependent Collective Adaptation in Self-Amending LLM Societies: A Cross-Family Study of Emergent Governance
首次提交 2026-05-17 23:45
版本更新 2026-11-07 08:56
雷达观测 2026-11-10 10:11
摘要
We study group decision-making in artificial societies where the rules of play are themselves subject to collective amendment. Using the self-amending game Nomic, we compare multiple scales across two LLM families and find that collective adaptation does not improve monotonically with model size. Instead, both families exhibit a narrow mid-scale regime that supports sustained rule adoption, diverse amendments, and balanced consensus. Smaller models tend to remain rule-inert, whereas larger models often converge on restrictive voting patterns, and heterogeneous mixed-size groups collapse into veto-driven gridlock. These cross-scale contrasts persist under temperature perturbations and under a shift from unanimity to majority voting, although latent-state structure varies by family and scale. Hidden-state divergence alone does not explain collective performance: high representational divergence can coincide with poor behavioural outcomes. Linear probes reveal regime-selective coupling between latent vote-predictive signals and collective behaviour, but decodability is necessary rather than sufficient for adaptive play. Overall, the recurring regularity is non-monotonicity, not the particular scale at which the optimum appears. Self-amending games therefore provide a controlled testbed for studying collective adaptation in artificial societies beyond raw model scale.
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v2 · 2026-11-07 08:56 · 最新观测版本
Scale-Dependent Collective Adaptation in Self-Amending LLM Societies: A Cross-Family Study of Emergent Governance
We study group decision-making in artificial societies where the rules of play are themselves subject to collective amendment. Using the self-amending game Nomic, we compare multiple scales across two LLM families and find that collective adaptation does not improve monotonically with model size. Instead, both families exhibit a narrow mid-scale regime that supports sustained rule adoption, diverse amendments, and balanced consensus. Smaller models tend to remain rule-inert, whereas larger models often converge on restrictive voting patterns, and heterogeneous mixed-size groups collapse into veto-driven gridlock. These cross-scale contrasts persist under temperature perturbations and under a shift from unanimity to majority voting, although latent-state structure varies by family and scale. Hidden-state divergence alone does not explain collective performance: high representational divergence can coincide with poor behavioural outcomes. Linear probes reveal regime-selective coupling between latent vote-predictive signals and collective behaviour, but decodability is necessary rather than sufficient for adaptive play. Overall, the recurring regularity is non-monotonicity, not the particular scale at which the optimum appears. Self-amending games therefore provide a controlled testbed for studying collective adaptation in artificial societies beyond raw model scale.
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