arXiv:2606.24832 · v2

Difference-Making without Making a Difference

首次提交 2026-06-24 01:15

版本更新 2026-10-29 23:10

雷达观测 2026-10-30 13:28

摘要

Over a series of seven papers, Andreas & Günther have introduced seven definitions of actual causation and have classified them as belonging to three different, competing, types of accounts: factual difference-making, counterfactual difference-making, and regularity-based. I show that their most recent -- factual difference-making -- definition instantiates all three types, thereby proving that these are distinctions without a difference. I further compare their novel account to the other six accounts on several crucial examples, revealing that this undermines all seven of their accounts.

作者备注：Accepted for publication in the Journal of Mathematical Philosophy