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arXiv:2608.16769 · v2

A Deployment-Oriented and Resource-Efficient Neuro-Symbolic Framework for Explainable DDoS Detection in Operational Technology Networks

面向部署的资源高效神经符号框架:用于运营技术网络的可解释DDoS检测

首次提交 2026-08-18 00:18
版本更新 2026-11-18 01:28
雷达观测 2026-11-18 12:34
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摘要

This paper presents a hybrid neural-symbolic detector of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on the availability of operational technology (OT) networks, designed for their resource-constrained gateways, and an evaluation matched to deployment. A compact gated recurrent unit (GRU) is fused at score level with a shallow, readable decision tree, and weight and threshold are selected on validation data under an explicit false-positive budget, whose attainment in finite samples is analysed. The evaluation on CIC-DDoS2019, Edge-IIoTset and CICIoT23 uses contiguous or capture-held-out partitions, dependence-aware intervals, and precision and alert load at operational prevalence. Over ten seeds at a 1% budget, the hybrid's false-negative rate on CIC-DDoS2019 is 0.08%, against 0.26% for the GRU and 0.17% for the tree. With a day of mostly unseen attack families held out, the tree alone carries the decision. Audits bound these claims: Edge-IIoTset is saturated by duplicates, no benchmark as used provides interleaved traffic in capture order, and an unconstrained tree is more accurate on two of them, so the case for the hybrid rests on short, stable rules and a measured footprint. On a Siemens SIMATIC IoT2050 gateway, tested with Modbus/TCP and MQTT floods, the INT8 model needs 2.9 ms per window, 31 MB of memory and 3.5 mJ per inference.

作者备注:15 Version 2

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基于摘要 · 非全文审阅

作者提出一种面向资源受限OT网关的神经符号DDoS检测器,将紧凑GRU与浅层可读决策树在分数级融合,并按部署条件评估其误报预算、可解释性与实测资源开销。

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v2 · 2026-11-18 01:28 · 最新观测版本

A Deployment-Oriented and Resource-Efficient Neuro-Symbolic Framework for Explainable DDoS Detection in Operational Technology Networks

This paper presents a hybrid neural-symbolic detector of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on the availability of operational technology (OT) networks, designed for their resource-constrained gateways, and an evaluation matched to deployment. A compact gated recurrent unit (GRU) is fused at score level with a shallow, readable decision tree, and weight and threshold are selected on validation data under an explicit false-positive budget, whose attainment in finite samples is analysed. The evaluation on CIC-DDoS2019, Edge-IIoTset and CICIoT23 uses contiguous or capture-held-out partitions, dependence-aware intervals, and precision and alert load at operational prevalence. Over ten seeds at a 1% budget, the hybrid's false-negative rate on CIC-DDoS2019 is 0.08%, against 0.26% for the GRU and 0.17% for the tree. With a day of mostly unseen attack families held out, the tree alone carries the decision. Audits bound these claims: Edge-IIoTset is saturated by duplicates, no benchmark as used provides interleaved traffic in capture order, and an unconstrained tree is more accurate on two of them, so the case for the hybrid rests on short, stable rules and a measured footprint. On a Siemens SIMATIC IoT2050 gateway, tested with Modbus/TCP and MQTT floods, the INT8 model needs 2.9 ms per window, 31 MB of memory and 3.5 mJ per inference.

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