跳到正文
研踪PaperTrail
← 研踪 PaperTrail

arXiv:2609.31494 · v4

Toward provably private learning from federated data

首次提交 2026-09-26 00:34
版本更新 2026-09-30 10:32
雷达观测 2026-10-29 15:15
arXiv ↗PDF ↗

摘要

Federated Learning (FL) allows devices with private data to collaborate in training a shared model. We present a next-generation FL system based on Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) that addresses operational challenges associated with earlier systems and provides externally verifiable central Differential Privacy (DP) guarantees for the first time while offering a better privacy-utility tradeoff. In our system, devices upload data encrypted with keys managed by a TEE-hosted Key Management Service (KMS). The uploaded data is cryptographically tied to a policy limiting the set of Python programs that may later process the data in server-side TEEs. External parties may inspect public transparency logs to observe the set of workloads allowed by these policies. Our experimental results show that the new system improves device coverage and favorably shifts privacy-utility curves by enabling collected data to be integrated into the server-side workload at a schedule that optimizes DP guarantees and is unaffected by device availability. Our new system has been productionized, enabling models for the Android Keyboard (Gboard) to be trained faster and achieve better accuracy under smaller, now externally verifiable privacy budgets in comparison to models trained using the prior system.

论文发现出处

这些页面提供论文线索,不代表同行评审或质量认证。

AI 论文解读

基于摘要 · 非全文审阅

提出基于可信执行环境(TEE)的下一代联邦学习系统,首次提供可外部验证的中心化差分隐私(DP)保证,并改善隐私-效用权衡。

正在读取账号与研究记录…

版本差异

目前只观测到一个版本,无法比较变化。之后收录新版本时,会在这里对照标题、作者、分类和摘要。

观测到的版本

相邻记录可能跳过中间版本;首次发现 v2 及以上也会标为版本更新。

v4 · 2026-09-30 10:32 · 最新观测版本

Toward provably private learning from federated data

Federated Learning (FL) allows devices with private data to collaborate in training a shared model. We present a next-generation FL system based on Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) that addresses operational challenges associated with earlier systems and provides externally verifiable central Differential Privacy (DP) guarantees for the first time while offering a better privacy-utility tradeoff. In our system, devices upload data encrypted with keys managed by a TEE-hosted Key Management Service (KMS). The uploaded data is cryptographically tied to a policy limiting the set of Python programs that may later process the data in server-side TEEs. External parties may inspect public transparency logs to observe the set of workloads allowed by these policies. Our experimental results show that the new system improves device coverage and favorably shifts privacy-utility curves by enabling collected data to be integrated into the server-side workload at a schedule that optimizes DP guarantees and is unaffected by device availability. Our new system has been productionized, enabling models for the Android Keyboard (Gboard) to be trained faster and achieve better accuracy under smaller, now externally verifiable privacy budgets in comparison to models trained using the prior system.

查看此版本解读 →查看此版本原文 ↗