← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2609.34458 · v2
Understanding Generalization Requires Universal Induction
首次提交 2026-09-28 15:15
版本更新 2026-11-04 13:08
雷达观测 2026-11-05 11:10
摘要
Classical statistical theory is insufficient to explain the successes of general-purpose AI models, because it depends on handcrafted inductive biases that it cannot justify. No Free Lunch (NFL) theorems force any learner that beats chance on some environments to underperform on others. We might hope that past experience informs which environments to expect, but NFL applies equally to meta-learning. Thus, any method that makes meaningful predictions necessarily begins with an inductive bias external to the data. Choosing to bias toward short programs yields Solomonoff induction (SI), whose performance is competitive against all computable learners - albeit up to "constants" that become large when comparing against specialized methods that exploit background information. We therefore relativize SI to an information vantage point, biasing toward short programs with access to all preexisting information. This reframes the inductive bias: instead of seeking some absolute notion of simplicity, we favour accessibility with respect to our vantage point. An algorithm can only outpredict the relativized SI to the extent that its code contains additional information about the data, and no algorithm can generate such information. While SI is incomputable and hence not a practical algorithm, it provides a formal optimum for inference in the limit of infinite compute, and there is evidence to suggest that frontier AI systems roughly approximate it. Thus, the only known answer to meta-NFL is rooted in algorithmic information theory, which we should expect to play a fundamental role in explaining the generalization behaviour of modern (and future) AI systems.
作者备注：Published at NeurIPS 2026 Position Paper Track
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v2 · 2026-11-04 13:08 · 最新观测版本
Understanding Generalization Requires Universal Induction
Classical statistical theory is insufficient to explain the successes of general-purpose AI models, because it depends on handcrafted inductive biases that it cannot justify. No Free Lunch (NFL) theorems force any learner that beats chance on some environments to underperform on others. We might hope that past experience informs which environments to expect, but NFL applies equally to meta-learning. Thus, any method that makes meaningful predictions necessarily begins with an inductive bias external to the data. Choosing to bias toward short programs yields Solomonoff induction (SI), whose performance is competitive against all computable learners - albeit up to "constants" that become large when comparing against specialized methods that exploit background information. We therefore relativize SI to an information vantage point, biasing toward short programs with access to all preexisting information. This reframes the inductive bias: instead of seeking some absolute notion of simplicity, we favour accessibility with respect to our vantage point. An algorithm can only outpredict the relativized SI to the extent that its code contains additional information about the data, and no algorithm can generate such information. While SI is incomputable and hence not a practical algorithm, it provides a formal optimum for inference in the limit of infinite compute, and there is evidence to suggest that frontier AI systems roughly approximate it. Thus, the only known answer to meta-NFL is rooted in algorithmic information theory, which we should expect to play a fundamental role in explaining the generalization behaviour of modern (and future) AI systems.
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