跳到正文
研踪PaperTrail
← 研踪 PaperTrail

arXiv:2609.35040 · v3

GAZEleak: Passcode Inference Against Eye-tracking XR Devices Through External Observation

首次提交 2026-09-28 20:38
版本更新 2026-11-16 20:23
雷达观测 2026-11-17 17:11
arXiv ↗PDF ↗

摘要

Mixed-reality headsets such as Apple Vision Pro replace the touch screen with gaze-as-pointer interaction: the wearer looks at a target and confirms with an air pinch. Because the display is inside the headset and the eye tracker is walled off from third-party software, such input is widely assumed to be unobservable to bystanders, a built-in defense against the shoulder-surfing that plagues phones and laptops. We present GAZEleak, a side-channel attack that recovers gaze-driven input from external video of head motion alone, under a strictly local, physical-observer threat model: the adversary only films the wearer from across the room and installs no software on the device. The attack exploits the centrally coupled eye-head motor program: gaze shifts recruit small, target-dependent head reorientations that project into sub-degree pose changes recoverable from commodity video. GAZEleak implements a measurement-based, sparse-optical-flow inference pipeline for users' 6-digit device passcodes. On a preliminary front-view dataset from three author-subjects who were aware of the attack hypothesis, GAZEleak places the true code within the top ten guesses for 56% (10 of 18) of test codes under a cross-person protocol with no labeled victim data, and for every code of the most exposed subject. The performance is subject-dependent: no passcode from the least exposed subject reaches the top ten, although its median guessed passcode rank is 12,786 rather than 500,000 expected from an uninformative ordering. These results provide preliminary evidence that gaze-coupled head motion can expose passcode information under controlled conditions, while motivating broader evaluation across users, behaviors, and capture settings.

作者备注:Published at ACM WPES 2026, co-located with ACM CCS 2026

期刊信息:Proceedings of the 25th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES '26), pp. 38-50, 2026

AI 论文解读

基于摘要 · 非全文审阅

此版本尚未生成 AI 解读。解读由后台任务生成并按论文版本保存,登录后共享已有结果。

版本差异

本站首次收录为 v3,暂无更早版本可对照。

观测到的版本

相邻记录可能跳过中间版本;首次发现 v2 及以上也会标为版本更新。

v3 · 2026-11-16 20:23 · 最新观测版本

GAZEleak: Passcode Inference Against Eye-tracking XR Devices Through External Observation

Mixed-reality headsets such as Apple Vision Pro replace the touch screen with gaze-as-pointer interaction: the wearer looks at a target and confirms with an air pinch. Because the display is inside the headset and the eye tracker is walled off from third-party software, such input is widely assumed to be unobservable to bystanders, a built-in defense against the shoulder-surfing that plagues phones and laptops. We present GAZEleak, a side-channel attack that recovers gaze-driven input from external video of head motion alone, under a strictly local, physical-observer threat model: the adversary only films the wearer from across the room and installs no software on the device. The attack exploits the centrally coupled eye-head motor program: gaze shifts recruit small, target-dependent head reorientations that project into sub-degree pose changes recoverable from commodity video. GAZEleak implements a measurement-based, sparse-optical-flow inference pipeline for users' 6-digit device passcodes. On a preliminary front-view dataset from three author-subjects who were aware of the attack hypothesis, GAZEleak places the true code within the top ten guesses for 56% (10 of 18) of test codes under a cross-person protocol with no labeled victim data, and for every code of the most exposed subject. The performance is subject-dependent: no passcode from the least exposed subject reaches the top ten, although its median guessed passcode rank is 12,786 rather than 500,000 expected from an uninformative ordering. These results provide preliminary evidence that gaze-coupled head motion can expose passcode information under controlled conditions, while motivating broader evaluation across users, behaviors, and capture settings.

查看此版本解读 →查看此版本原文 ↗