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arXiv:2610.35835 · v2

I-HITL: Inalienable Human-in-the-Loop

首次提交 2026-10-27 01:52
版本更新 2026-10-28 01:41
雷达观测 2026-10-29 00:34
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摘要

Human oversight is a pillar of AI safety. It is often exercised by a human in the loop (HITL) who approves critical actions taken by an AI agent. AI agents' increasing ability to bypass guardrails, though, raises the question of how to enforce HITL robustly. We introduce the concept of inalienable human-in-the-loop (I-HITL). An I-HITL protocol ensures that an agent can initiate an action only with explicit human approval, even when the human interacts with a system (e.g., a local agentic harness) compromised by the agent. A strong I-HITL protocol additionally ensures such approval even when an adversarial human attempts to delegate approvals to an agent. To motivate I-HITL, we report on experiments with a popular agentic wallet platform in which raising an agent's spending cap requires HITL approval via emailed one-time passcodes (OTPs). Given access to the user's email and a task blocked by the cap, we find that ten different frontier models will often autonomously raise the cap, harvesting OTPs to bypass a HITL guardrail and surfacing other vulnerabilities. We formally define I-HITL using the concept of communication topologies and prove necessary and sufficient conditions for its realization. We show that an I-HITL protocol requires a trusted entity - a trusted computing device (or equivalent) - and characterize which such devices can and cannot realize an I-HITL protocol. We present a prototype I-HITL system called Countersign that can plug into and strengthen existing HITL systems using off-the-shelf consumer mobile devices.

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v2 · 2026-10-28 01:41 · 最新观测版本

I-HITL: Inalienable Human-in-the-Loop

Human oversight is a pillar of AI safety. It is often exercised by a human in the loop (HITL) who approves critical actions taken by an AI agent. AI agents' increasing ability to bypass guardrails, though, raises the question of how to enforce HITL robustly. We introduce the concept of inalienable human-in-the-loop (I-HITL). An I-HITL protocol ensures that an agent can initiate an action only with explicit human approval, even when the human interacts with a system (e.g., a local agentic harness) compromised by the agent. A strong I-HITL protocol additionally ensures such approval even when an adversarial human attempts to delegate approvals to an agent. To motivate I-HITL, we report on experiments with a popular agentic wallet platform in which raising an agent's spending cap requires HITL approval via emailed one-time passcodes (OTPs). Given access to the user's email and a task blocked by the cap, we find that ten different frontier models will often autonomously raise the cap, harvesting OTPs to bypass a HITL guardrail and surfacing other vulnerabilities. We formally define I-HITL using the concept of communication topologies and prove necessary and sufficient conditions for its realization. We show that an I-HITL protocol requires a trusted entity - a trusted computing device (or equivalent) - and characterize which such devices can and cannot realize an I-HITL protocol. We present a prototype I-HITL system called Countersign that can plug into and strengthen existing HITL systems using off-the-shelf consumer mobile devices.

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