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arXiv:2610.36712 · v1

Characterizing Maximum Nash Welfare: Envy-Freeness and Proportionality

首次提交 2026-10-27 14:27
版本更新 2026-10-27 14:27
雷达观测 2026-10-29 00:35
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摘要

When allocating indivisible goods, the maximum Nash welfare rule is known to be the unique welfarist rule satisfying envy-freeness up to one good. We strengthen this characterization by showing that envy-freeness up to one good can be replaced by substantially weaker fairness requirements: envy-freeness up to $k$ goods or proportionality up to $k$ goods, for any fixed $k$. Our characterization holds even for profiles with identical goods.

期刊信息:Economics Letters, 269:113310 (2026)

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v1 · 2026-10-27 14:27 · 最新观测版本

Characterizing Maximum Nash Welfare: Envy-Freeness and Proportionality

When allocating indivisible goods, the maximum Nash welfare rule is known to be the unique welfarist rule satisfying envy-freeness up to one good. We strengthen this characterization by showing that envy-freeness up to one good can be replaced by substantially weaker fairness requirements: envy-freeness up to $k$ goods or proportionality up to $k$ goods, for any fixed $k$. Our characterization holds even for profiles with identical goods.

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