← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2610.36712 · v1
Characterizing Maximum Nash Welfare: Envy-Freeness and Proportionality
首次提交 2026-10-27 14:27
版本更新 2026-10-27 14:27
雷达观测 2026-10-29 00:35
摘要
When allocating indivisible goods, the maximum Nash welfare rule is known to be the unique welfarist rule satisfying envy-freeness up to one good. We strengthen this characterization by showing that envy-freeness up to one good can be replaced by substantially weaker fairness requirements: envy-freeness up to $k$ goods or proportionality up to $k$ goods, for any fixed $k$. Our characterization holds even for profiles with identical goods.
期刊信息:Economics Letters, 269:113310 (2026)
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v1 · 2026-10-27 14:27 · 最新观测版本
Characterizing Maximum Nash Welfare: Envy-Freeness and Proportionality
When allocating indivisible goods, the maximum Nash welfare rule is known to be the unique welfarist rule satisfying envy-freeness up to one good. We strengthen this characterization by showing that envy-freeness up to one good can be replaced by substantially weaker fairness requirements: envy-freeness up to $k$ goods or proportionality up to $k$ goods, for any fixed $k$. Our characterization holds even for profiles with identical goods.
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