← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2610.36824 · v1
Who Knows What - and What Does It Support? Perspective-Bounded Evidence Calibration for Multimodal Theory of Mind
首次提交 2026-10-27 16:23
版本更新 2026-10-27 16:23
雷达观测 2026-10-29 00:35
摘要
Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer others' beliefs, goals, and intentions, is a cornerstone of social intelligence. Multimodal ToM requires inferring an agent's mental state from evidence that is available to that agent, rather than from the complete episode observed by the solver. Existing LLM-based and Bayesian model-based approaches reconstruct global event traces, yet they do not explicitly distinguish objective events from agent-admissible evidence during hypothesis evaluation. Consequently, agent-inaccessible events or semantically misaligned actions and utterances may influence the inferred belief, goal, or social intention, leading to perspective leakage and source or route confusion. We formulate this limitation as an evidence-admissibility problem: evidence should contribute to a mental-state hypothesis only when it is accessible to the relevant agent, preserves its information source, and is diagnostic of the queried mental-state variable. To operationalize this principle, we propose PIP-ToM, an evidence-admissibility interface that constructs agent-specific evidence stores, aligns them with structured mental-state claims, and calibrates model-based hypothesis scores while preserving the underlying Bayesian inference process. PIP-ToM with GPT-4o outperforms existing ToM methods across MuMA-ToM, MMToM-QA, and Hi-ToM, achieving average accuracies of 92.56%, 95.00%, and 95.00%, respectively.
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v1 · 2026-10-27 16:23 · 最新观测版本
Who Knows What - and What Does It Support? Perspective-Bounded Evidence Calibration for Multimodal Theory of Mind
Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer others' beliefs, goals, and intentions, is a cornerstone of social intelligence. Multimodal ToM requires inferring an agent's mental state from evidence that is available to that agent, rather than from the complete episode observed by the solver. Existing LLM-based and Bayesian model-based approaches reconstruct global event traces, yet they do not explicitly distinguish objective events from agent-admissible evidence during hypothesis evaluation. Consequently, agent-inaccessible events or semantically misaligned actions and utterances may influence the inferred belief, goal, or social intention, leading to perspective leakage and source or route confusion. We formulate this limitation as an evidence-admissibility problem: evidence should contribute to a mental-state hypothesis only when it is accessible to the relevant agent, preserves its information source, and is diagnostic of the queried mental-state variable. To operationalize this principle, we propose PIP-ToM, an evidence-admissibility interface that constructs agent-specific evidence stores, aligns them with structured mental-state claims, and calibrates model-based hypothesis scores while preserving the underlying Bayesian inference process. PIP-ToM with GPT-4o outperforms existing ToM methods across MuMA-ToM, MMToM-QA, and Hi-ToM, achieving average accuracies of 92.56%, 95.00%, and 95.00%, respectively.
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