跳到正文
研踪PaperTrail
← 研踪 PaperTrail

arXiv:2610.36962 · v1

Do bots feel bad? Assessing empirical evidence for functional valence in LLMs

首次提交 2026-10-27 18:19
版本更新 2026-10-27 18:19
雷达观测 2026-10-29 00:35
arXiv ↗PDF ↗

摘要

Do LLMs have valenced states, i.e. states that feel pleasant or unpleasant? Recent empirical work has claimed to show that LLMs possess functional valenced states (e.g. ``functional pleasure and pain'' [Ren et al. 2026], ``functional emotions'' [Sofroniew et al. 2026], and ``functional welfare'' [Han et al. 2026]) that play the same causal role as valenced states in cognition and action, without necessarily being consciously experienced. But it remains unexplored how well the identified states fit the functional role of valence as understood in the philosophical and cognitive science literature. Here, I assess the current body of evidence, and argue (i) that key aspects of valence remain untested in LLMs, and (ii) that extant empirical paradigms inadequately distinguish (functional) valence from neighbouring constructs like preferences, value-judgments, valence attributions and role-play. I conclude by sketching some novel experimental approaches to better target (functional) valence itself.

AI 论文解读

基于摘要 · 非全文审阅

此版本尚未生成 AI 解读。解读由后台任务生成并按论文版本保存,登录后共享已有结果。

版本差异

目前只观测到一个版本,无法比较变化。之后收录新版本时,会在这里对照标题、作者、分类和摘要。

观测到的版本

相邻记录可能跳过中间版本;首次发现 v2 及以上也会标为版本更新。

v1 · 2026-10-27 18:19 · 最新观测版本

Do bots feel bad? Assessing empirical evidence for functional valence in LLMs

Do LLMs have valenced states, i.e. states that feel pleasant or unpleasant? Recent empirical work has claimed to show that LLMs possess functional valenced states (e.g. ``functional pleasure and pain'' [Ren et al. 2026], ``functional emotions'' [Sofroniew et al. 2026], and ``functional welfare'' [Han et al. 2026]) that play the same causal role as valenced states in cognition and action, without necessarily being consciously experienced. But it remains unexplored how well the identified states fit the functional role of valence as understood in the philosophical and cognitive science literature. Here, I assess the current body of evidence, and argue (i) that key aspects of valence remain untested in LLMs, and (ii) that extant empirical paradigms inadequately distinguish (functional) valence from neighbouring constructs like preferences, value-judgments, valence attributions and role-play. I conclude by sketching some novel experimental approaches to better target (functional) valence itself.

查看此版本解读 →查看此版本原文 ↗