arXiv:2610.38313 · v1

Game-Theoretic Foundations for Undiscounted Bisimulation Metrics

首次提交 2026-10-28 13:55

版本更新 2026-10-28 13:55

雷达观测 2026-10-30 10:22

摘要

Bisimulation metrics offer a principled notion of task-relevant state similarity in reinforcement learning, but existing constructions and methods are largely confined to discounted MDPs, where contraction arguments ensure well-defined fixed points and downstream guarantees. We develop a unified foundation for bisimulation metrics in undiscounted settings, that is total- and average-reward problems, by replacing the standard operator-centric view with a game-centric one: we interpret prior metric operators as Bellman-Shapley operators of zero-sum turn-based games and define metrics as the corresponding game value functions, yielding unique definitions even when $γ=1$. This game-theoretic foundation facilitates transfer of dynamic-programming theory and algorithms. We also use this game-centric perspective to characterize how metric finiteness depends on structural properties of the underlying MDP and motivate certain directed metrics that remain finite in weakly communicating MDPs. We further introduce an abstract framework for modifying the games' action spaces, allowing general transition coupling sets, that recovers many existing metrics and guides new constructions. Finally, we prove that these metrics bound total-reward and, when the optimal gain is state-independent, optimal relative value differences. We also provide error and suboptimality guarantees for aggregation-based planning in total- and average-reward settings.