← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2611.03301 · v2
An Axiomatic Framework for Reinforcement Learning in Open Multi-Agent Systems
首次提交 2026-11-02 23:36
版本更新 2026-11-03 21:15
雷达观测 2026-11-04 23:39
摘要
Open multi-agent systems, where only a subset of agents are controllable, are central to real-world domains such as smart grids, yet lack a principled foundation for reinforcement learning algorithm design. We study this setting through n-agent ad hoc teamwork (NAHT), a recent framework for learning in open multi-agent environments. We propose an axiomatic framework that derives value function learning from the Shapley axioms (Efficiency, Symmetry and Linearity), treating them as structural constraints rather than heuristic design choices. This formulation builds on a novel NAHT decomposition, which characterises the fundamental difference between open and fully controllable multi-agent systems, and establishes a cooperative game-theoretic foundation for learning. We further show that enforcing these axioms on learning individual value functions recovers the Shapley value for Dec-POMDPs, providing a principled bridge between reinforcement learning and classical cooperative game theory. Building on this framework, we introduce Shapley Machines and Banzhaf Machines, two generic algorithmic templates that can be instantiated with standard reinforcement learning methods. When applied to strong base algorithms such as IPPO and POAM, our methods consistently improve learning efficiency and generalisation to unseen agent types and conventions across NAHT benchmark tasks. The code of experiments is published on https://github.com/hsvgbkhgbv/axiomatic-rl-naht.
作者备注：43 pages, Published at NeurIPS 2026
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v2 · 2026-11-03 21:15 · 最新观测版本
An Axiomatic Framework for Reinforcement Learning in Open Multi-Agent Systems
Open multi-agent systems, where only a subset of agents are controllable, are central to real-world domains such as smart grids, yet lack a principled foundation for reinforcement learning algorithm design. We study this setting through n-agent ad hoc teamwork (NAHT), a recent framework for learning in open multi-agent environments. We propose an axiomatic framework that derives value function learning from the Shapley axioms (Efficiency, Symmetry and Linearity), treating them as structural constraints rather than heuristic design choices. This formulation builds on a novel NAHT decomposition, which characterises the fundamental difference between open and fully controllable multi-agent systems, and establishes a cooperative game-theoretic foundation for learning. We further show that enforcing these axioms on learning individual value functions recovers the Shapley value for Dec-POMDPs, providing a principled bridge between reinforcement learning and classical cooperative game theory. Building on this framework, we introduce Shapley Machines and Banzhaf Machines, two generic algorithmic templates that can be instantiated with standard reinforcement learning methods. When applied to strong base algorithms such as IPPO and POAM, our methods consistently improve learning efficiency and generalisation to unseen agent types and conventions across NAHT benchmark tasks. The code of experiments is published on https://github.com/hsvgbkhgbv/axiomatic-rl-naht.
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