← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2611.05816 · v1
GRIDSHIELD: Verifiable Grid Feasibility and Manipulation Resistance in Privacy-Preserving Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading
首次提交 2026-11-04 09:49
版本更新 2026-11-04 09:49
雷达观测 2026-11-05 10:08
摘要
Blockchain-based peer-to-peer (P2P) energy markets let neighbors trade directly, but concentrate unchecked power in the clearing operator. Most prior work addresses only part of this: network-aware clearing respects grid constraints but operates on plaintext allocations, while privacy-preserving designs hide bids yet either drop the network constraint, enforce it only inside an unauditable computation, or recover it at the cost of a per-circuit trusted setup. Neither considers what happens if an adversary captures the operator's clearing privilege to reorder trades for profit or curtail a rival. We present GRIDSHIELD, a P2P energy-trading system that clears sealed bids with an order-independent batch program, removing the welfare a compromised operator can extract by reordering trades, and proves the result grid-feasible via an aggregated congestion-feasibility proof (ACFP). Exploiting the additive homomorphism of Pedersen commitments, ACFP reconstructs each grid constraint directly from per-bus commitments, reducing feeder-wide feasibility verification over any public grid constraints to a single aggregated range proof over the hidden allocation, with a reveal-and-recompute challenge that catches feasible yet unfair clearings. We introduce congestion-responsibility fairness (CRF), a metric scoring curtailment against each party's physical responsibility for congestion rather than consumption. We evaluate GRIDSHIELD against three prior P2P energy-trading designs across four feeders, including a 240-node Midwest feeder with real hourly loads, on a live Hyperledger Fabric network benchmarked with Hyperledger Caliper. GRIDSHIELD proves an entire round feasible with a few-kilobyte proof and no trusted setup, rejects infeasible allocations two of the three compared designs accept, and sustains $\approx$1064 tx/s.
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v1 · 2026-11-04 09:49 · 最新观测版本
GRIDSHIELD: Verifiable Grid Feasibility and Manipulation Resistance in Privacy-Preserving Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading
Blockchain-based peer-to-peer (P2P) energy markets let neighbors trade directly, but concentrate unchecked power in the clearing operator. Most prior work addresses only part of this: network-aware clearing respects grid constraints but operates on plaintext allocations, while privacy-preserving designs hide bids yet either drop the network constraint, enforce it only inside an unauditable computation, or recover it at the cost of a per-circuit trusted setup. Neither considers what happens if an adversary captures the operator's clearing privilege to reorder trades for profit or curtail a rival. We present GRIDSHIELD, a P2P energy-trading system that clears sealed bids with an order-independent batch program, removing the welfare a compromised operator can extract by reordering trades, and proves the result grid-feasible via an aggregated congestion-feasibility proof (ACFP). Exploiting the additive homomorphism of Pedersen commitments, ACFP reconstructs each grid constraint directly from per-bus commitments, reducing feeder-wide feasibility verification over any public grid constraints to a single aggregated range proof over the hidden allocation, with a reveal-and-recompute challenge that catches feasible yet unfair clearings. We introduce congestion-responsibility fairness (CRF), a metric scoring curtailment against each party's physical responsibility for congestion rather than consumption. We evaluate GRIDSHIELD against three prior P2P energy-trading designs across four feeders, including a 240-node Midwest feeder with real hourly loads, on a live Hyperledger Fabric network benchmarked with Hyperledger Caliper. GRIDSHIELD proves an entire round feasible with a few-kilobyte proof and no trusted setup, rejects infeasible allocations two of the three compared designs accept, and sustains $\approx$1064 tx/s.
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