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arXiv:2611.06076 · v1

Breaking the One-Player Extension Barrier: History-Aware Repair for Multiplayer Approximate Nash Equilibria

首次提交 2026-11-04 15:20
版本更新 2026-11-04 15:20
雷达观测 2026-11-05 11:10
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摘要

Computation of Nash equilibria is a central problem in algorithmic game theory, yet exact equilibrium computation is $\mathsf{PPAD}$-complete even for two-player games. This hardness motivates the study of polynomial-time algorithms for approximate Nash equilibria. While substantial progress has been made for two-player and three-player games, existing algorithms for general $m$-player games have largely relied on repeatedly applying one-player extension starting from improved fixed-player algorithms. Such improvements can at best strengthen the classical $1-1/m$ guarantee to $1-1/(m-c)$, for some constant $c$ independent of $m$. We break this long-standing barrier by developing an iterative algorithm that directly tackles general $m$-player games and achieves a $(1-(σ_{\star}-ε)/m)$-approximation for fixed $ε> 0$ and sufficiently large $m$, where $σ_\star\approx1.5867$ is the unique root in $(1,2)$ of $σ_\star^3-19σ_\star^2+27σ_\star+1=0$. Our approach rests on a novel iterative descent-and-repair framework that allows multiple rounds of repair. At the heart of our analysis is a new potential function inspired by continuous-time dynamics, which certifies progress across iterations and ensures polynomial-time termination. Our results highlight the power of history-aware, iterative repair in breaking approximation barriers for multiplayer games.

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v1 · 2026-11-04 15:20 · 最新观测版本

Breaking the One-Player Extension Barrier: History-Aware Repair for Multiplayer Approximate Nash Equilibria

Computation of Nash equilibria is a central problem in algorithmic game theory, yet exact equilibrium computation is $\mathsf{PPAD}$-complete even for two-player games. This hardness motivates the study of polynomial-time algorithms for approximate Nash equilibria. While substantial progress has been made for two-player and three-player games, existing algorithms for general $m$-player games have largely relied on repeatedly applying one-player extension starting from improved fixed-player algorithms. Such improvements can at best strengthen the classical $1-1/m$ guarantee to $1-1/(m-c)$, for some constant $c$ independent of $m$. We break this long-standing barrier by developing an iterative algorithm that directly tackles general $m$-player games and achieves a $(1-(σ_{\star}-ε)/m)$-approximation for fixed $ε> 0$ and sufficiently large $m$, where $σ_\star\approx1.5867$ is the unique root in $(1,2)$ of $σ_\star^3-19σ_\star^2+27σ_\star+1=0$. Our approach rests on a novel iterative descent-and-repair framework that allows multiple rounds of repair. At the heart of our analysis is a new potential function inspired by continuous-time dynamics, which certifies progress across iterations and ensures polynomial-time termination. Our results highlight the power of history-aware, iterative repair in breaking approximation barriers for multiplayer games.

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